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Abstract
Long-established major U.S. corporations such as McDonald's,
Walmart, and Proctor and Gamble continue to derive a majority of
revenues from foreign operations. In addition, a number of relatively new
U.S. technology companies such as: Airbnb (founded in 2008); Facebook
(founded in 2004); Snap (founded in 2011); Twitter (founded in 2006);
and Uber (founded in 2009), find themselves deep into international
markets, often within just a few years of creation, and certainly by the
end of their first decade of operation. Increased international commerce
results in the potential for greater exposure to global demands for bribery.
Bribery and corruption remains a cancer eating away at the ability of
nation states to provide for their citizens. Corrupt payments siphon off
funds that might otherwise be used to: provide housing; feed the hungry;
fight poverty, illness and disease; and educate the masses.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework
offers a valuable tool in the anti-fraud struggle and in FCPA and U.K.
Bribery Act compliance. COSO's 2017 update to the Enterprise Risk
Management-Integrated Framework addresses developments during
recent years in integrating risk with strategy into the ERM process. Our
paper proceeds in eight parts. First, we discuss the bribery and corruption
problem. Second, a discussion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) is presented. Third, we describe the U.K. Bribery Act. Fourth,
we discuss the development and evolution of the COSO ERM
Framework. Fifth, we apply the COSO ERM Framework as an anti-fraud
strategy to assist in compliance with the FCPA and U.K. Bribery Act.
Sixth, we discuss the application of Deferred Prosecution Agreements to
the FCPA and their relevance to COSO ERM. Next, we explore the likely
changes in FCPA enforcement under the Trump Administration and then
we conclude. We believe this Article contributes to the bribery and
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corruption literature by exploring the potential benefits of the COSO
framework.
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OVERVIEW

as McDonald's,1
Long-established major U.S. corporations such

Walmart,2 and Proctor and Gamble 3 continue to derive a majority of
revenues from foreign operations. In addition, a number of relatively new
U.S. technology companies such as: Airbnb (founded in 2008)4;
Facebook (founded in 2004)'; Snap (founded in 2011)6; Twitter (founded
in 2006)7; and Uber (founded in 2009)8, find themselves deep into
international markets, often within just a few years of creation, and
9
certainly by the end of their first decade of operation. Increased
international commerce results in the potential for greater exposure to
global demands for bribery. Bribery and corruption remains a cancer
their citizens. 10
eating away at the ability of nation states to provide for
Corrupt payments siphon off funds that might otherwise be used to:

i. Lawrence J. Trautman, U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets: Focus on
Bribery and Corruption (Feb. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2912072.
2. Walmart Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 33 (Jan. 31, 2018).
3. The Proctor & Gamble Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (June 30, 2018).
4. See About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Jan. 19,
2018).
5. See About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/?ref=page_
internal (last visited June 2, 2018).
6. See Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 6 (Feb. 2, 2017).
7. See Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 9 (Oct. 3, 2013).
8. See The History of Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/ (last
viewed June 2, 2018). See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the
Struggle of Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQUETTE L. REV. 447 (2018) (discussing
high growth start-ups); Lawrence J. Trautman, Rapid Technological Change and U.S.
Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets: Focus on Bribery and Corruption (Feb. 6, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (discussing exposure of rapidly growing U.S. entrepreneurial ventures
to bribery and corruption risk), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912072.
9. See Lawrence J. Trautman et al., Beginning to Think About Ethics and Values in an
Age of Rapid Technological Change (Feb. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract-3102552.
10. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Trust, Honesty, and Corruption: Reflection on the StateBuilding Process, 42 EURO. J. Soc. 27 (2001); Campbell R. Harvey, Country Risk Components,
the Cost of Capital, and Returns in Emerging Markets (Nov. 18, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=620710; Julio Bacio-Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human
Rights, INT'L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL'Y (forthcoming), https:/ssrn.com/abstractl 107918;
Sanjeev Gupta et al., Does CorruptionAffect Income Inequality and Poverty? (IMF, Working
Paper No. 98/76, 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=882360; Simon Johnson et al., Corruption,
Public Finances, and the Unofficial Economy (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 2169,
9
1999), https:/ssrn.com/abstract=19256 ; Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption:
Political Institutions Matter (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 2708, 2001),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=632777; Susan Rose-Ackerman, 'Grand' Corruptionand the Ethics of
Global Business (Yale Law Sch. Program for Stud. in Law, Econ. and Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper
No. 221, 1999), https://ssm.com/abstract=191352.
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provide housing; feed the hungry; fight poverty, illness and disease; and
11
educate the masses.

The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework
offers a valuable tool in the anti-fraud struggle and in FCPA and U.K.
Bribery Act compliance. 12 COSO's 2017 update to the Enterprise Risk
Management- Integrated Framework addresses developments during
recent years in integrating risk with strategy into the ERM process.13
Our paper proceeds in eight parts. First, we discuss the bribery and
corruption problem. Second, a discussion of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) is presented. Third, we describe the U.K. Bribery
Act. Fourth, we discuss the development and evolution of the COSO
ERM Framework. Fifth, we apply the COSO ERM Framework as an antifraud strategy to assist in compliance with the FCPA and U.K. Bribery
Act. Sixth, we discuss the application of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (DPAs) to the FCPA and their relevance to COSO ERM.
Next, we explore the likely changes in FCPA enforcement under the
Trump Administration. Then, we conclude. We believe this paper
contributes to the bribery and corruption literature by exploring the
potential benefits of the COSO framework.
I. THE BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION PROBLEM

Much has been written during recent years about the problem of
pervasive global bribery and corruption.14 A comprehensive treatment of
11. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruptionand Policy Reform (Yale Law &
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 444, 2012), https://ssn.com/abstract-2007152; Alvaro CuervoCazurra, Who Cares about Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 803 (2006); Paolo Mauro, The
Effects ofCorruptionon Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure (IMF, Working Paper
No. 96/98, 1996), https://ssm.com/abstract-882994; Vito Tanzi & Hamid R. Davoodi,
Corruptior Growth, and Public Finances (IMF, Working Paper No. 00/182, 2000),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-880260; Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development:
Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? (World Bank, Pol'y Res., Working
Paper No. 2048, 1999), https://ssm.com/abstract=604923; Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A
Comparative Study of Inequalityand Corruption(Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Org., Working Paper
No. 22, KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-001, 2004), https://ssrn.comlabstract-489823.
12. Welcome to COSO, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N,
https://www.coso.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). COSO is ajoint initiative of
five private sector organizations: American Accounting Association; American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants; Financial Executives International; The Association of Accountants
and Financial Professionals in Business; and the Institute of Internal Auditors. See id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Bruce W. Bean, The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence ofAccountability
in Switzerland, 32 U. MD. J. INT'L L. 68 (2017); Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA:
InternationalResonance and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 1611 (2017); Maria T. CabanGarcia, Antibribery Efforts in Brazil, 98 STRAT. FIN. 48 (2017); Nishant Dass et al., Geographic
Clusteringof Corruptionin the U.S.?, PARIS DEC. 2017 FIN. MEETING EUROFIDAI-AFFI (2017),

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol30/iss3/2
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19'

all issues surrounding bribery and corruption far exceeds the scope of this
Article. Rather, our purpose here is to present an update and a few
thoughts about recent developments in FCPA enforcement while
focusing on COSO as an effective risk management tool. However, a few
threshold definitions are necessary.
A. Bribery andExtortion
A bribe is described by The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) as:
[An] ... offer, promise, or giving of any undue pecuniary or

other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries,
to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third
party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the
conduct of international business". The Commentaries to the
Convention (paragraph 9) clarify that "small 'facilitation'
payments do not constitute payments made 'to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage' within the
meaning of paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not an
offence. Such payments, which, in some countries, are made
to induce public officials to perform their functions, such as
issuing licenses or permits, are generally illegal in the
foreign country concerned. Other countries can and should

https://ssm.com/abstract-2981317; Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, Causes and Effects of
Corruption: What Has Past Decade's Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey, 32 J. ECON.
When
SURVEYS 335 (2018); M. Shahe Emran et al., Distributional Effects of Corruption
Enforcement is Biased: Theory and Evidence from Bribery in Schools in Bangladesh (Feb. 17,
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract=3125495; David Hess, Business,
Corruption, and Human Rights: Towards a New Responsibilityfor Corporations to Combat
Corruption, 641 Wisc. L. REV. 642 (2017); Yujin Jeong & Jordan I. Siegel, Threat of Falling
High Status and CorporateBribery: Evidence from the Revealed Accounting Records of Two
South Korean Presidents, 39 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1083 (2018); Robert W. McGee, The Panama
Papers: A Discussion of Some Ethical Issues, 3 J. INS. & FIN. MGMT. 1 (2017); Sharon Oded,

Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual Accountability for Corporate
Corruption,35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 50 (2016); Jarnie Bologna Pavlik, Corruption: The Good,
the Bad, and the Uncertain, 22 REV. DEV. ECON. 311 (2018); Andrew Brady Spalding, Restoring
Pre-Existing Compliance Through the FCPA Pilot Program,48 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 520 (2017);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Grab 'Em By The Emoluments: The Crumbling Ethical Foundation of
Donald Trump's Presidency, 17 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 170 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman,

Followingthe Money: Lessonsfrom the PanamaPapers,Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST.
L. REV. 807 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneur in China: Potholes and
Roadblocks on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE F. J. Bus. & INT'L PROP. L. 427 (2012);
Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct: Minefield
for Directors, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 146 (2011).
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address this corrosive phenomenon by such means as
support for programmes of good governance ... 15
Article 1 of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted by the
negotiating conference on November 21, 1997 states:
The Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from
acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in
order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business.
2. Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish
that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting,
or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public
official shall be a criminal offence. Attempt and conspiracy
to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal offences
to the same extent as attempt
and conspiracy to bribe a public
16
official of that Party.
Black's Law Dictionary defines Bribery as "The corrupt payment,
receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action"; 1 7 commercial
bribery as "(1) The knowing solicitation or acceptance of a benefit in
exchange for violating an oath of fidelity, such as that owed by an
employee, partner, trustee, or attorney; [(2) omitted]; (3) Corrupt dealing
with the agents or employees of prospective buyers to secure an
advantage over business competitors." 18 Extortion is defined as "(1) the
offense committed by a public official who illegally obtains property
under the color of office; esp., an official's collection of an unlawful fee.
(2) the act or practice of obtaining something or compelling some action
by illegal means, as by force or coercion."19

15. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, art. 1,
1, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43

[hereinafter OECD Convention on Combating Bribery].
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. arts. 1,2.
Bribery, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).
Commercial Bribery, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).
Extortion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol30/iss3/2
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B. Corruption
Mark Farrales observes, "there is currently no universally accepted
definition of corruption. The primary reason for this is that corruption is
a cross-systemic, cross-temporal and cross-cultural phenomenon
(emphasis added)., 20 Furthermore, "it is impossible to arrive at a single
definition of corruption that can accurately identify all possible cases, at
21
all different times, and under all forms and levels of government.", The
ancient world provides an excellent example of how corruption has
always existed. Farrales observes, "Scholars like Daniel Kaufman and
Vito Tanzi... cit[e] an Indian text, The Arthashastra, which is
approximately 2400 years old. In part of that text, Kautilya, one of the
advisors to the emperor Chandragupta Maurya, talks about the
' 22
inevitability of corruption, and of the need to restrain it." Accordingly,
Chandragupta Maurya states:
Imported goods shall be sold in as many places as
possible... [and] local merchants who bring in foreign
goods by caravan or by water routes shall enjoy exemption
from taxes, so that they can make a profit. The King shall
protect trade routes from harassment by courtiers, state
officials, thieves and frontier guards... [and] frontier
officers shall make good what is lost ....Just as it is
impossible not to taste honey or poison that one may find at
the tip of one's tongue, so it is impossible for a government
servant not to eat up at least a bit of the King's
ways of
revenue.... And there are about forty
23
servant...
government
the
by
embezzlement
Some scholars such as Nathaniel Leff by the mid-1960s had adopted
value-free concept of defining the term corruption,whereby,
almost
an
"Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to
gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. The existence of
corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the
decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the
case." 24 Joseph Nye is credited with perhaps the most famous
definitions- wherein, "[Corruption
of the "public-office-centered"
is] ... behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role
20. Mark J. Farrales, What is Corruption?: A History of Corruption Studies and the Great
Definitions Debate 32 (June 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/
abstract- 1739962; see also Lawrence Lessig, Foreword: 'InstitutionalCorruption'Defined,41 J.
L. MED. & ETHIcs 553, 554 (2013).
21. See Farrales, supra note 20, at 32.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. (citing KAUTILYA, THE ARTHASHASTRA, 281 (L.N. Rangarajan trans., Penguin Books

I st ed. 1992)).
24. Id. at 15.
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(elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close
family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence., 25 British
sociologist Robert Neild highlights the role of public opinion in his 2002
definition by observing that corruption is, "The breaking by public
persons, for the sake of private financial or political gain, of the rules of
conduct in public affairs prevailing in a society in the period under
consideration." 26 Taking a more tautological approach, the Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners in its Occupational Fraud and Abuse
Classification System (the Fraud Tree) uses corruption as a broad
category consisting of conflicts of interest, bribery, illegal gratuities, and
economic extortion. 27 The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
defines corruption as "a scheme in which an employee misuses his or her
influence in a business transaction in a way that violates his or her duty
to the employer in order to gain a direct or indirect benefit (e.g., schemes
involving bribery or conflicts or interest)., 2 8 Regarding a purely legal
approach to the definition of corruption, Farrales observes:
In contrast to the public opinion school, a few scholars have
favored defining corruption in purely legalistic terms. Where
a public official breaks the law for private gain, then
corruption has occurred. When officials have not broken any
law, or when no law exists to regulate questionable conduct,
then corruption has not occurred. Andreski for example,
defines corruption as "the practice of using the power of
office for making private gain in breach of laws and
regulations nominally in force" (1968: 92). Similarly,
Theobald (1990) defines corruption as "the illegal use of
public office for private gain." In general, this debate about
how to define "abuse of public office" seems to be
misplaced, as most corruption scholars tend to agree that
both formal laws and public opinion matter in determining
what constitutes a corrupt action. (This is in fact one of the
reasons for why it is so difficult to pin down a universally
acceptable definition.) For instance, it should be noted that
although Nye uses the phrase "formal duties" in his
definition, he himself agrees that the precise form of
corruption is often closely connected to the norms and
customs of individual nations. Even recent scholars like Vito

25. Id. at 17.
26. Id. at 23.
27. See ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'R, REPORT TO THE NATIONS 2018: GLOBAL STUDY
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 11 (2018) [hereinafter ACFE REPORT TO THE NATIONS].
28. Id. at 78.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol30/iss3/2
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Tanzi (1994) who adopt legalistic definitions emphasize
29 the
differences.
cultural
and
norms
role of public opinion,
Isaac Binkovitz observes, "[c]orruption and bribery affect not only
major political decisions or the actions of the largest corporations, but
also millions of private-sector commercial transactions (such as contract
bids and permit applications)., 30 Binkovitz believes that bribery and
corruption are counterproductive and wasteful because:
First, the value paid in the bribe is value not allocated to
some more productive use. Second, the benefit conferred
upon the bribing party may incentivize socially
counterproductive behavior or crime. For example, a less
qualified contractor or a contractor who has entered a less
competitive bid ought not win a contract by virtue of a bribe
alone. Bribery may cause the job to be completed poorly or
at too high a cost, directly and detrimentally affecting the
public. Third, bribery undermines the legitimacy of the
government in the eyes of its citizens and others who interact
with it. This could reduce public willingness to cooperate
with officials for other useful purposes. And, finally,
corruption leaves the bribing party unable to enforce the
bargain after the fact. For example, a land registry official
could take a bribe to grant title to a specific plot of land.
However, when an adverse claimant offers a competing,
larger bribe, the official is in a position to renege on the
original bargain or raise the price for a counterbid bribe.
Thus, bribery does not represent a one-time cost, but the
ongoing problem of uncertainty, which can stifle business
planning 31and increase financing costs. [internal references
omitted]
In their 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency
International observes "that the majority of countries are making little or
no progress in ending corruption, while further analysis shows journalists
and activists in corrupt countries risking their lives every day in an effort
to speak out." 32 Based on an annual survey of businesspeople and
industry experts, the Index measures perceptions of public sector
corruption in 180 countries. 33 For 2017, "New Zealand and Denmark rank
29. See Farrales, supra note 20, at 23.
30. See Isaac Binkovitz, Recent Changes in U.S. And UK. Overseas Anti-Corruption
Enforcement Under the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Law: Private Equity Compliance, 3 MiCH.
Bus. & ENTRE. L. REv. 75, 78 (2013).
31. Id.
32. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Feb. 21, 2018),

https:www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruptionperceptionsfindex_2017

[hereinafter

CorruptionPerceptionsIndex].

33. Id.
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highest... Syria, South Sudan and Somalia rank lowest.., respectively.
The best performing region is Western Europe... The worse performing
regions are Sub-Saharan Africa... and Eastern Europe and Central
Asia." 34 TI's Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 also shows that, "[s]ince
2012, several countries significantly improved their index score,
including C6te d'Ivoire, Senegal and the United Kingdom, while several
' '35
countries declined, including Syria, Yemen and Australia.
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price have previously stated, "in any of
its various forms, bribery, extortion, or corruption exacts an unacceptable
toll on all citizens of the world.",36 In addition, "thinking about the
difficult issues surrounding corruption produced a realization that the
global and domestic culture of bribery, extortion, and corruption is an
amorphous cancer eating away at our societies with the very real potential
to destroy commerce between nations and produce destructive global
37
civil unrest.,
II.

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

A. History and Purpose
Celebrating its 40th year since passage during 2017, the FCPA
primarily addresses the two distinct activities of bribery and improper
record keeping. 38 In relevant part, the Statute prohibits (1) payments of

anything of value to foreign officials "in order to assist [the payor] in
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person;" 39 and (2) failing to keep records and books "which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
34. See id. See generally Serkan Benk et al., Confidence in Government and Attitudes
toward Bribery: A Country-Cluster Analysis of Demographic and Religiosity Perspectives, 8
RELIGIONS 1 (2017) ( detailing corruption in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Western Europe);
Teresa Hernandez & Robert W. McGee, A DemographicStudy ofAfrican Attitudes on Bribery,
15 J.AccT., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541 (2014); Teresa Hernandez & Robert W. McGee, Attitudes
Toward Bribery in Australia: A Demographic Study, 24 EURO ASIA J.OF MGMT. 57 (2014)
(detailing corruption in Sub-Sahara Africa) [hereinafter Bribery in Australia]; Teresa Hernandez
& Robert W. McGee, The Ethics ofAccepting a Bribe: An EmpiricalStudy of Opinion in the USA,
Brazil, Germany and China, 6 INT' L J.OF BUS., ACCT., AND FIN. 178 (2012); Teresa Hernandez &
Robert W. McGee, The Ethical Perceptions of Bribe Taking in Four Muslim Countries, 15 J.
ACCT., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 185 (2014) (detailing corruption in Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran).
35. See Corruption PerceptionsIndex, supra note 32. See generally Teresa Hernandez &
Robert W. McGee, EthicalAttitudes toward Taking a Bribe: A Study ofFourEuropean Countries,
22 EURO ASIA J.MGMT. 3 (2012) (detailing corruption in France, UK, Italy, Germany); Bribery
in Australia,supra note 34, at (detailing corruption in Australia).
36. See Lawrence J.Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and Money-The
Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act, 47 INT'L L. 481, 483 (2013).
37. Id.
38. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et. seq. (1998).
39. Id. § 78dd-l(a)(1).
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assets of the issuer." 40 As the Fifth Circuit observed in United States v.
Kay, "When the FCPA is read as a whole, its core of criminality is seen
to be bribery of a foreign official to induce him to perform an official
duty in a corrupt manner., 41 In addition, the anti-bribery portion of the
Statute seeks to criminalize:
only those payments that are intended to (1) influence a
foreign official to act or make a decision in his official
capacity, or (2) induce such official to perform or refrain
from performing some act in violation of his duty, or (3)
secure some wrongful advantage to the payor. And even
then, the FCPA criminalizes these kinds of payments only if
the result they are intended to produce-their quid pro
in efforts
quo-will assist (or is intended to assist) the payor
to get or keep some business for or with 'any person.'42
To understand the genesis of the FCPA, it is important to recall the
political environment of 1977 and developments leading up to creation
of the Statute. We are fortunate to have the recent oral history provided
by Judge Stanley Sporkin who was serving as director of the Division of
Enforcement at the SEC at the time. During October 2012 Judge Sporkin
recalled:
The FCPA was not the result of some Congressional
investigation, nor was anyone out there saying that too much
bribery was going on. The beginning of the FCPA movement
came about during the testimony at the Watergate Hearings
which had disclosed that an offshore subsidiary of an
American corporation was providing cash to its parent in
New York City that was placed in the parent corporation's
safe. This money became a slush fund for the corporation to
do whatever they wanted to do with the cash--- and in this
case, cash from the slush fund had been given directly to
President Nixon's reelection campaign. I'm a CPA and I
started to wonder 'how does a corporation make such an
illegal contribution?'
One of these issues is how do these funds get booked? And how do
accountants deal with it? It turns out that these funds were not booked
for the stated purpose and in other instances were run through the petty
cash account so that the accountants were missing this at audit because
the funds were not material (in amount) to a very large corporation. We
then examined what other uses were made of these funds and we found
that vast amounts of money were being used to bribe foreign officials. It
40. Id. § 78m (b)(2)(A).
41. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 761 (5th Cir. 2004).
42. Id. at 740-41.
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turns out that in some instances these funds were not expensed, because
people didn't want to run afoul of the IRS.
As I continued to explore how we at the SEC ought to deal with this,
it occurred to me that-while maybe not material from a financial
amount (QuantitativeMateriality), this conduct and these bribery funds
are materialunder a concept of Qualitative Materiality.We formulated
a theory to proceed against those corporations on the basis they were not
disclosing the illegal conduct. We had brought about sixty cases before
Senator William Proxmire called and asked 'Do you need a law?' I said,
sure; but all it needs to say is that 'every corporation must have accurate
books and records. Our [SEC's] chief accountant, Sandy Burton, added
the provision that corporations must have accurate internal controls.
These two provisions: (1) accurate books and records, and (2) internal
controls--- became the 'books and records' provisions of the law. Senator
Proximire was in agreement; but said, we also need an anti-bribery
provision-and that became the essence of the law, 'books and records'
and anti-bribery.
After passage of the law, we got push-back from issuers complaining
about how they can't be spending all this time on compliance and that it
was making American companies non-competitive. This evolved into a
volunteer program-where if an issuer made a good faith effort, which
entailed a voluntary investigation of their overseas conduct, we accepted
their report and never sued them. But, in summary, the FCPA was not
the result of a 'do good' proposal. It was more the case that if the SEC
has a requirement regarding disclosure, then you should have accurate
disclosure. If a corporation was making money through bribery and other
illicit payments, this had to be disclosed to shareholders.43
B. Recent FCPA Developments
During 2017, the most recent year of available statistics for the FCPA,
a total of 39 combined enforcement actions were brought by the two
agencies authorized by the Statute to do so, the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 44 Exhibit
1 illustrates total Combined DOJ/SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions Per
Year (1978-2017).
43. Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct: An
Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 Sec. Reg. L.J. 241, 243 (2013) (citing

Hon. Stanley Sporkin, Panel Discussion: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at SMU Corporate
Counsel Symposium (Oct. 5, 2012); Telephone Interviews with Hon. Stanley Sporkin (July 1011, 2013); e-mails from Hon. Stanley Sporkin to Lawrence J. Trautman (July 2, 10-11, 2013) (on

file with author)) [hereinafter FCPA Update].
44. See Memorandum from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP to Clients and Friends, 2017
Year-End FCPA Update 1 (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/2017-year-end-fcpa-update- I.pdf [hereinafter Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Memo].
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Exhibit 1
Actions
Combined DOJ/SEC FCPA Enforcement
45
Per Year (1978-2017)
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A total of 39 combined enforcement actions were brought during 2017
"by the U.S. Department of Justice ('DOJ') and Securities and Exchange
Commission ('SEC'), the statute's dual enforcers, joined in many cases

by a global legion of anti-corruption enforcers unlike anything imagined
four decades ago." 46 Gibson Dunn observes, "the FCPA-the only one of
its kind when enacted-is now joined by numerous other international
corruption laws, multinational conventions, and hundreds of
investigators, prosecutors, and regulators worldwide with a mission of
47
ensuring a level playing field in global business markets." Exhibit 2
depicts total months of Prison Sentences Imposed in FCPA Cases (19782017).

45. Id.at 2.
46. Id. at i.
47. Id.
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Exhibit 2
Prison Sentences Imposed in FCPA Cases (1978-2017)
48
(Total Months)
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Source: Gibson Dunn, SEC & DOJ

Gibson Dunn reports that five enforcement trends appear particularly
noteworthy during 2017:
1. Multi-jurisdictional anti-corruption resolutions continue
apace;
2. DOJ continues to demonstrate a focus on culpable
individuals;
3. DOJ and the SEC bring FCPA cases absent proof of
bribery;
4. Recurring enforcement actions; and
5. DOJ and the SEC push the boundaries of foreign official.49
As shown by Exhibit 3, depicting the Total Value of FCPA Monetary
Resolutions (1978-2017), it appears that substantial monetary resolutions
start to manifest at about years 2007-2008,50 or roughly when the United
States encounters a mortgage-driven economic crisis.'

48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. See id. at 4.

51. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics & the U.S. Financial Collapse of 2007-08
(Aug. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2502124.
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Exhibit 3
Total Value of Corporate FCPA Monetary Resolutions
(1978-2017)52
($ Millions)
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Exhibit 4 illustrates FCPA Enforcement Actions by Country (19782017). We can see from this Exhibit that the countries responsible for the
greatest number of enforcement actions are: China (89); Nigeria (75);
Arabia (36); Argentina
Mexico (60); Indonesia (50); Iraq (48); Saudi
53
(35); Brazil (35); India (30); and Russia (29).

52. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Memo, supra note 44, at 4.
53. Id. at 5.
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Exhibit 4
54
FCPA Enforcement Actions by Country (1978-2017)
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A casual reader taking a look at the above Exhibits might reasonably

pose the question-why, during the first 20 years of the FCPA are there
so few prison sentences imposed (Exhibit 2); or, essentially no significant
monetary penalties (Exhibit 3)? Only 40 cases total were brought on a
combined basis by the SEC and DOJ during the first two decades of
FCPA (1977 and 1996). 5 Law professor Rachel Brewster observes, "the
median year would see two cases or fewer and settled these charges on
sympathetic terms (the average of the ten highest fines was under $10

54. Id. See generallySerkan Benk, Robert W. McGee & Tamer Budak, A Public Perception
Study on Bribery as a Crime in Turkey, 25 J.Fin. Crime 337 (2018); Teresa Hernandez & Robert
W. McGee, EthicalAttitudes Toward Takinga Bribe: A Study of Three Latin American Countries,
8 INT'L J.Bus. & ECON. PERSPECTIVES 142 (2013); Teresa Hernandez & Robert W. McGee, The
Ethics of Accepting a Bribe: A Comparative Study of Opinion in the USA, Canada and Mexico,
14 J.AcCT.ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 945 (2013); Robert W. McGee, Attitudes toward Accepting a
Bribe: A Comparative Study of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in I
Handbook of Asian Finance: Financial Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds (David Lee Kuo
Chuen & Greg N. Gregoriou eds., 1st ed. 2014).
55. See Brewster, supra note 14, at 1614.
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million).56 This compares with 428 cases brought between 1997 and
2016, and the beginning of "blockbuster settlements (the average of the
ten highest fines in that period was $484 million). Even accounting for
inflation, the tenth highest fine today is more than twice the combined
penalties of the top ten fines between 1977 and 1996."57
So what changed during the first and second twenty-year periods of
FCPA enforcement that resulted in the statute gaining priority
enforcement status? Professor Brewster argues, "that the FCPA could not
be robustly enforced until federal prosecutors could adopt an
'international-competition neutral' strategy-that is, an enforcement
strategy that allowed them to charge both American corporations and
their foreign rivals, thus creating a level playing field in international
commerce." 58 In addition:
The U.S. government needed an international agreement that
established a strong foreign anti-bribery principle in other
major exporting states. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Anti-Bribery
Convention provided this necessary piece and emboldened
U.S. prosecutors to use their long-standing jurisdiction to
target domestic and foreign corporations who violated the
FCPA ....
After the initial passage of the FCPA, American industry
argued that the FCPA put them at a competitive
disadvantage with foreign rivals, who would not be bound to
similar anti-bribery rules. When the FCPA was enacted,
other major developed countries (such as Germany and the
United Kingdom) did not prohibit foreign bribery and even
subsidized it by making bribes tax-deductible. This made the
enforcement of the FCPA politically unviable. Various
efforts were made to repeal the statute, but these efforts were
largely muted by the executive branch's decision simply not
to dedicate resources to enforcement... Early in the FCPA
history, the executive branch strategically lowered the
perceived costs of the statute to American businesses by only
rarely bringing prosecutions and then settling those cases on
modest terms. While the law still imposed a potential
liability, the expected costs to U.S. corporations were low.
Nonetheless, the fact that the United States was the only state
with a foreign anti-bribery law on the books put pressure on
legislators and the executive to negotiate an international
agreement binding other states to similar rules. Legislators
56. Id. See generally Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell, The Market for Global
Anticorruption Enforcement, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (2017).
57. Brewster, supra note 14, at 1614.
58. Id. at 1615.
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repeatedly demanded that the executive conclude a treaty on
foreign anti-bribery rules, and U.S. presidents almost
continuously attempted to do so in multiple international
fora. In addition, some key U.S. multinational corporations
(including General Electric, Boeing, and Merck),
determined that anti-bribery policies were good business
models and sought increased enforcement of such policies in
the United States and abroad. These public and private
efforts finally bore fruit in the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, which effectively exported the FCPA's
restrictions to all of the major developed economies ....
The conclusion of the OECD Convention permitted U.S.
prosecutors to dramatically increase enforcement of the
statute, beginning the era of tough anti-bribery regulation
that we currently know. Again, U.S. officials' enforcement
of the FCPA was strategic: prosecutors now enforced the
FPCA territorially and extraterritorially to capture the widest
possible range of domestic and foreign corporations. This
broad enforcement strategy minimized the competitive costs
to U.S. companies by attempting to hold foreign companies
to the same rules as American companies and thereby
secured continued domestic support for the statute. This
strategy was possible only because the OECD Convention
established anti-bribery as a binding principle (legitimating
U.S. officials' prosecution of nonnational corporations) and
required cross-national legal assistance in building cases.
The OECD Convention was instrumental in transitioning
from minimal to rigorous enforcement. In 1998 alone, one
year after the conclusion of the OECD Convention, the U.S.
government opened over seventy-five foreign bribery
investigations, entering a new phase of FCPA
enforcement. 9
And now the "so what" question-What appears to be the bottom-line
impact of FCPA enforcement on international business, bribery and
corruption? Stanford professors Rebecca Perlman and Alan Sykes
observe, "enforcement of anti-corruption laws aimed at foreign bribery
remains in relative infancy outside the United States." 6 °
FCPA practitioners questioned by Pearlman and Sykes, "emphasized
that in a variety of industries, their clients' foreign competitors remain
outside U.S. jurisdiction under the FCPA. Accordingly, in the current
59. Id. at 1615-17. Another contributing change may be the increased use of DPAs in the
last 10 years. See Peter R. Reilly, Corporate Deferred Prosecution as DiscretionaryInjustice,
2017 UTAH L. REV. 839, 841 (2017).
60. Rebecca Perlman & Alan Sykes, The Political Economy of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct: An ExploratoryAnalysis, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 153, 178 (2017).
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international environment, the effect of vigorous FCPA enforcement on
the national economic interest of the United States remains an important
and unresolved issue."6 1 Pearlman and Sykes further state:
We also suspect that disproportionate enforcement by the
United States may not be a long-term equilibrium. Various
commentators have suggested to us that foreign enforcement
is growing, even if it is not yet nearly as vigorous as U.S.
enforcement. Brazil, for example, has recently been involved
in substantial anti-corruption actions in cooperation with
U.S. enforcers in cases relating to Embraer and
Odebrecht/Braskem, and has collected substantial fines.
Likewise, as mentioned previously, there is evidence that
been
recent initiatives under the OECD Conventionbyhave
signatory
cortion
6
s
deterring
in
effective
increasingly
references omitted).
countries. (internal
Emory University economics professors Maria Arbatskaya and Hugo
Mialon published research during 2017 about the FCPA's impact on
bribery, productive investment, and competitiveness:
Our results show that if the FCPA is applied only to U.S.
firms, then it harms the competitiveness of U.S. firms and
either increases bribery by non-U.S. firms or reduces
productive investment by both U.S. and non-U.S. firms.
However, if the FCPA is applied to both U.S. and non-U.S.
firms and targets activity in host countries with high
corruption levels, then it does not a priori harm the
competitiveness of U.S. firms, and it reduces bribery and
increases productive investment by both U.S. and non-U.S.
firms. We also find that the recent history of FCPA
enforcement actions indicates that the FCPA is increasingly
being applied to non-U.S. as well as U.S. multinationals
through cooperation from foreign govern-ments. Provided
this trend of international cooperation in anti-bribery efforts
continues, our analysis suggests that the FCPA will not
and will deter bribery while
weaken U.S. competitiveness
63
investment.
stimulating
III. U.K. BRIBERY ACT

As reported by Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price, four core categories
of offenses are created by the U.K. Bribery Act 2010:
61. Id.
62. Id. at 179.

63. See Maria N. Arbatskaya & Hugo M. Mialon, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on Competitiveness, Bribery, and Investment (July
manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract-3001262.
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(1) bribing another person;
(2) taking bribes;
(3) bribing foreign public officials; and
(4) failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery.64
"With its expansive scope and jurisdictional reach, the U.K. Bribery
Act significantly reshapes the UK's anti-corruption regime., 65 Isaac
Binkovitz writes that the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 contains a "prohibition
on bribery [that] goes beyond its American counterpart to include
payments made in the private sector, in addition to those made to foreign
public officials. Notably, the U.K. Bribery Law extends to facilitation
payments and provides no defense in the form of legality under local
custom, law, or practice." 66 Binkovitz further states, "[tihe U.K. Bribery
Law has been called draconian by some and is widely seen as the most
far-reaching and severe of anti-corruption laws globally., 67 The U.K.
statute exceeds the scope of the FCPA "to include payments made in the
private sector, in addition to those made to foreign public officials. 68
Additional differences between the U.K. Bribery Act and the FCPA
include the treatment of active versus passive bribery and the treatment
of facilitation payments. The FCPA covers only active bribery, the giving
of a bribe, whereas the U.K. Bribery Act covers both giving and receiving
a bribe.6 9 The FCPA includes an exemption for facilitation payments,70
but the U.K. Bribery Act does not; 71 however, some guidance issued by
the Ministry of Justice and the Serious Fraud Office suggests that the
purpose of the payment may be considered when a determination is made
of whether or not to prosecute.72
There is also a notable difference in the availability of affirmative
defenses. In contrast to the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act statute "explicitly
64. See BriberyAct 2010: JointProsecutionGuidance of the Directorofthe Serious Frauds
office and the Director of Public Prosecutions, CPS, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-

guidance/bribery-act-2010-joint-prosecution-guidance-director-serious-fraud-office-and

(last

visited Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Bribery Act 2010: Joint ProsecutionGuidance].
65. E-Alert: GlobalAnti-Corruption,Anti-Corruption Mid-Year Review 1, COVINGTON &
BURLIG LLP (July 2011), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2011/07/

anti-corruption-mid-year-review---beijing.pdf.
66. Binkovitz, supra note 30, at 82.
67. Id. at 83.

68. Id. at 82.
69. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,15 U.S.C. § § 78dd- I-78dd-3 (1998); Bribery
Act 2010, c. 23, § 2 (U.K), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/2.
70. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).
71. See generally Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/

201 0/23/contents.
72. See Bribery Act 2010: Joint ProsecutionGuidance, supra note 64.
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provides an affirmative defense in the form of so-called adequate
procedures. The establishment and implementation of adequate
procedures to avoid corruption shields a firm and its management from
criminal and civil liability. 73 This affirmative defense applies only to socalled section 7 offenses, 74 offenses in which bribery was carried out on
behalf of the company, and the associated person issuing the bribe would
be guilty of an offense under either section 1, bribing another person, or
75
section 6, bribery of a foreign public official. Even the failure to
implement adequate procedures does not mean that prosecution is a
foregone conclusion, as noted by Isaac Binkovitz, "For firms that fail to
implement adequate procedures, the U.K. Bribery Law offers to stay
criminal prosecution in exchange for self-reporting and cooperation with
investigators." 76 Listed affirmative defenses under the FCPA do not
address preventative procedures of the company but rather give the
company the opportunity to defend a payment that was made, if it "was
official's,
lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign
77
political party's, party official's, or candidate's country" or was a
"reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party
official, or candidate and was directly related to(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or
services; or
of a contract with a foreign
(B) the execution or performance
78
thereof.
agency
or
government
The nature of the affirmative defense under the U.K. Bribery Act
starkly contrasts the UK's treatment of a company's level of knowledge
of third party action imputed to the company with that of the United
States per the FCPA. The FCPA does have a mens rea component,
specifically a knowledge requirement.7 9 This requirement is ostensibly
80
reinforced with the modifiers "corruptly" and "willfully." However,

73. Binkovitz, supra note 30, at 83; See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/2.
23
/
74. See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/

section/2.
75. Bribery Act 2010: Joint ProsecutionGuidance, supra note 64.
76. Binkovitz, supra note 30, at 83.
77. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1) (1998).
78. Id. § 78dd-2(c)(2).
79. See id. § 78dd-2(a)(3) ("[K]nowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign
political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office .... ").
80. Steven R. Salbu, Mitigatingthe Harshnessof FCPA Enforcement Through a Qualifying

Good-FaithCompliance Defense, 55 AM. Bus. L. J. 475, 499 (2018).
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interpretation of the mens rea element has been left open, due in part to
the lack of case law on the issue. 8 1 As noted by Salbu:
The DOJ and SEC may invoke willful blindness, deliberate ignorance,
and conscious disregard to satisfy the knowledge required for an FCPA
offense by a principal when an anti-bribery violation is carried out by a
third party. In such situations, the knowledge requirement for FCPA
liability may not adequately protect companies acting in reasonable good
faith, such that a good-faith compliance program defense could have
82
value.
The DOJ may use requirements for a compliance program or
modification of an existing program as terms of DPAs83 or No
Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), but such action serves to settle past
8
violations, not prevent their commission. 1
Professor Roman Tomasic observes, "In many ways.., the passage
of legislation such as the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 is a significant regulatory
development as it has been a catalyst for enhanced anti-bribery internal
controls in large corporations." 85 After presenting a detailed critique,
Professor Eric Engle writes, "Although the U.K. anti-bribery act is badly
crafted it does raise international standards because it effectively forces
corporations to institute effective procedures to prevent bribery such as
corporate codes of conduct, internal trainings, contractual provisions, and
86
'triple bottom line' auditing."
A low rate of convictions to date by the U.K's Serious Frauds Office
(SFO) has resulted in The Wall Street Journal reporting that the actual
future of the SFO has been under question.8 7 However, during early June
2018, Lisa Osofsky, a former high-ranking FBI attorney and U.S.
prosecutor, was named director of the U.K. Serious Frauds Office.8 8

81.

Id.

82. Id. at 500.
83. See infra Section VII.B.
84. Salbu, supra note 80, at 508.
85. Roman Tomasic, Global Corporations,Bribery and Corrupt Practices Anti-Bribery
Laws and the Limits of State Action, L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2),

https://ssm.com/abstract-3124082 (citing Anna P. Donovan, Systems and Controls in AntiBribery and Corruption, in THE LAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 239, 239 (Iris H-Y

Chiu ed., 2015)).
86. Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Helpfrom My Friends? Understandingthe UK AntiBribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention, and the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,

44 INT'L LAW. 1173, 1188 (2011).
87. Margot Patrick, Former U.S. Federal ProsecutorNamed Directorof U.K SFO, WALL

ST. J. (June 4, 2018),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-u-s-federal-prosecutor-named-

director-of-u-k-sfo- 1528118801.

88. Id.
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IV. COSO ERM FRAMEWORK
A. COSO ERM and the FCPA
Any U.S. company that conducts business operations outside the
United States could be subject to FCPA enforcement and should consider
89
implementing an FCPA compliance program. An FCPA compliance
program is a "single, documented, corporate plan designed to reduce the
likelihood that the company will engage in violations of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA, and to detect such violations and bring them to
90
the attention of senior management, if they occur." Such a system is
necessary for two reasons. First, in the case of publicly traded companies,
it meets direct requirements of the FCPA. Second, it meets indirect
requirements of the act vis a vis a monitoring component. The COSO
91
both requirements.
ERM framework offers a standardized way to meet
Regarding direct requirements of the FCPA, the COSO ERM framework
incorporates both record keeping and a system of controls. Under the
92
FCPA, both of these are required of publicly traded companies. The
indirect requirement tied to monitoring stems from interpretation of
language in the FCPA, specifically the mens rea "knowing" requirement.
Per the FCPA, it is unlawful to make certain payments to any person
while "knowing" that all or a portion of the said payment will be offered,
given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign governmental or
93
political official for illegal purposes. A company "knows" of such
conduct, circumstance or result if it is aware of the conduct, circumstance
or result or has a "firm belief' that the circumstance exists or that the
94
result is substantially likely to occur. Knowledge is also established
when there is awareness of a high probability that a circumstance has or
will occur unless the company actually believes that such circumstance
does not exist. 95 A company is expected to be aware of its risks related to

89. Daniel L. Goelzer, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program: Minimizing the Risks of
ImproperForeign Payments, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 282, 282 (1998).
90. Id.
See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK
INTEGRATING WITH STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 3-4 (2017) (discussing value
MANAGEMENT91.

creation, preservation, erosion, and realization) [hereinafter COSO ERM].
92. Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1997).
93. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)-(a)(2) (1998). As
used in this article, illegal purposes are: influencing any act or decision of the recipient in his or
her official capacity, inducing him or her to omit to perform any act in violation of his or her duty,
or using his or her influence to affect government decisions; influencing any act or decision made
by the recipient in an official capacity, inducing an omission to act, or inducing the recipient to
use influence with his or her government.
94. Id. §§ 78dd-l(f)(2)(A), 78dd-2(h)(3)(A).
95. Id. §§ 78dd-l(f)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

23

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2

FLORI)A JOURNAL 0F INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol- 30

the FCPA. 96 With that expectation in place coupled with the possibility
of knowledge being established when there is simply awareness of a high
probability, it becomes incumbent upon a company to both clearly assess
the likelihood of its risks and continuously monitor. Specific monitoring
mechanisms can take many forms. 9 7 The ERM framework includes
monitoring as a standard activity.
B. Company Tools to Combat FCPA Violations
Different tools are available for a company determined to deal with
the risk of FCPA violations including internal controls and ERM. For
FCPA, internal controls can serve as part of the ERM solution but alone
are insufficient, therefore ERM is the better option.
1. Corporate Internal Controls
Corporate internal controls are a common response to regulatory or
financial problems. 98 In the past they were generally beneficial when the
goal was to help the company meet its objectives and the expectation of
results was modest. 99 When they are used as the leading policy option
they "become processes designed to prevent certain undesired events
from occurring, a conception creating greater expectations."' 0'° These
great expectations are hard to fulfill as the very nature of internal controls
cannot offer infallibility.' 01 The factors that influence the success of
internal controls as policy options and that ultimately ruin their hopes for

96. DEP'T OF JUST. & SEC, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRAcTICS
ACT
56-58
(2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-

fraud/legacy/201 5/01/16/guide.pdf (noting the need for a strong compliance program to enable
compliance with the FCPA and explaining that assessment of risk if fundamental to developing
such a program) [hereinafter FCPA GUIDANCE].
97. See Goelzer, supranote 89, at 301-02 (providing examples and explanations of specific

controls geared to monitoring FCPA compliance including review of documentation associated
with particular transactions/contracts/events, interviews with employees involved in high-risk

areas of corporate activity, review of supporting documentation for cash expenditures, and review
of consultants' and agents' contracts).

98. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of InternalControls to FightFraud,
Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J.CORP. L. 267, 268-69 (2004).

99. Id. at 269.
100. Id.

101. Id.at 299 ("Internal controls are processes not events and are performed by people
organization wide. Both elements imply the possibility of control leakage. This is reemphasized
by repeating the ultimate purpose of controls: they are intended to meet designated objectives in
ways offering reasonable (not absolute) assurance. Factors influencing the success of these
elements of control are environmental and procedural. Environmental factors concern employee
attitudes towards and awareness of controls, as well as their actions in light of those perceptions.
Procedural matters refer to rules governing authorization/execution of transactions, duty
segregation, documentation and recordkeeping, and limiting access to assets and records.").
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infallibility are environmental and procedural-" 2 The better solution, if
not the optimal, would be one that considers environmental and
procedural factors in addition to technical ways to address the specific
risk.
In addition, internal controls may be limited by an auditor's
perception of risk. 0 3 As compared to the legal perspective, internal audit
allows for greater residual risk. 104 "Law does not seek to address risk
10 5 The difference
100%, but it is closer to that ambition than audit is."
begins with context for assessing risk; audit begins with a formal, precise
106
context whereas the legal view is more abstract. Addressing the unique
combined regulatory and strategic risks introduced by FCPA
enforcement requires a framework that can incorporate both the precise
and the abstract. That objective cannot be met purely by internal controls,
but it can with ERM.
2. Enterprise Risk Management
Risk management is the process of a company identifying and
addressing risks that are or could impact its strategy and business
operations. Risk management can be seen as a substitute for equity
capital: "By reducing risk, a company can reduce the amount of
expensive equity capital needed to support its operating risks... an
important part of the job of the chief risk officer (CRO) and top
management is to evaluate the tradeoff between more active risk
and equity."' 10 7
management and holding a larger buffer stock of cash
0 8
ERM is a holistic approach to managing risk.' ERM fosters the idea that
risk must be looked at across and throughout the entire organization.
ERM is to be managed at the macro level, instead of individual
in isolation. 10 9
component functions managing their perceived risks
102. Id. ("Environmental factors concern employee attitudes towards and awareness of
controls, as well as their actions in light of those perceptions. Procedural matters refer to rules
governing authorization/execution of transactions, duty segregation, documentation and
recordkeeping, and limiting access to assets and records.").
103. Id. at 306 (contrasting the business perspective of internal controls with the legal
perspective).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Brian W. Nocco & Ren6 M. Stulz, EnterpriseRisk Management: Theory and Practice,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2006).
108. Robert E. Hoyt & Andre P. Liebenberg, The Value of EnterpriseRisk Management, 78
J. RISK & INS. 795, 795 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter Value of Enterprise Risk Management]; Andr6 P.
Liebenberg & Robert E. Hoyt, The Determinants ofEnterpriseRisk Management: Evidencefrom
the Appointment of ChiefRisk Officers, 6 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 37, 37 (2003) [hereinafter The
Determinants of EnterpriseRisk Management].
109. See Value of EnterpriseRisk Management, supranote 108 at 795; The Determinantsof
EnterpriseRisk Management, supranote 108, at 39-40.
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Therefore, the company is required to manage all risks together in a
coordinated and strategic framework as opposed to individual
departments managing risk by risk in isolation." The goal of ERM is to
maintain and increase the organization's value."'
Drivers of the ERM movement are strategic, financial and
regulatory. 1 12 On the strategic and financial sides there is a perception
that managing risk more holistically will bring financial benefits to the
company that would otherwise be missed because synergies were
overlooked." t 3 ERM influences the development of a company's
strategy.11 4 Regulatory pressure for ERM stems from responses to prior
financial crisis, namely Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank. The
challenge to identify and quantify risk is now required to be captured in
the company's financial statements, 15 An increase in general stakeholder
expectations for risk management is noted, 16 along with an evolution in
the kinds of risk that are managed. 1 7 ERM can help the company
identify, analyze, and explain risks to meet regulatory requirements,
while enhancing the company's capacity to "create and preserve value for
its stakeholders.""18 Representing a holistic approach to risk
management, ERM gives companies an important framework to analyze
110. Nocco & Stulz, supra note 107, at 8.
111. See COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 3-4 (discussing value creation, preservation, erosion,
and realization).
112. See Leen Paape & Roland F. Spekl6, The Adoption and Design of Enterprise Risk
Management Practices:An EmpiricalStudy, 21(3) EUR. ACCT. REv., 533, 537-38 (2012) (listing

five factors associated with extent of general ERM implementation: (I) regulatory influences; (2)
internal influences; (3) ownership; (4) auditor influence; and (5) firm and industry-related
characteristics); see also The Determinants ofEnterpriseRisk Management, supranote 108, at 40

(breaking down factors into internal and external forces).
113. Value of EnterpriseRisk Management, supra note 108, at 796 ("[Tjhere is an absence
of empirical evidence regarding the impact of such programs on firm value."); The Determinants
ofEnterpriseRisk Management, supra note 108, at 41 (explaining the logic behind believing that

managing risks will increase value).
114. COSO ERM, supranote 91, at 4.

115. Risk disclosure is required but declaration of ERM use is not. Still, it may be possible
to determine if ERM is used by a company through analysis of that company's financial
statements or more generally the appointment of a CRO. See generally Value of Enterprise Risk
Management, supra note 108; The DeterminantsofEnterpriseRisk Management, supra note 108.
116. Paape & Spekhd, supra note 112, at 533.

117. Nocco & Stulz, supra note 107, at 8 ("[C]orporate risk management has expanded well
beyond insurance and the hedging of financial exposures to include a variety of other kinds of
risk -notably operational risk, reputational risk, and, most recently, strategic risk."); COMM. OF
SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENTINTEGRATING
WITH STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2017) ("Stakeholders are more

engaged today, seeking greater transparency and accountability for managing the impact of risk
while also critically evaluating leadership's ability to crystalize opportunities.") [hereinafter
COSO ERM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].

118. Paape & Spekl6, supra note 112, at 534.
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how well the company is prepared to manage risk, including the kind of
risks stemming from enforcement under the FCPA.
Numerous specific frameworks are available-some company
specific and developed internally, some sophisticated, and others more
9
closely resembling a series of ad hoc risk responses." Frameworks and
2
implementation may vary, with each identifying different components. °
However, certain components are common including "formal written
statement of risk appetite, correlating and determining portfolio effects
of combined risks, having a senior manager assigned the responsibility of
overseeing risk and risk management, and a formal risk management
21
report submitted to board level regularly."'1 Each of the commonly
identified ERM components will likely help a company manage FCPA
compliance risk. In particular, having an established risk management
program with clear monitoring controls and regular audits can reduce
potential fines or charges associated with a suspected FCPA violation. It
might even reduce costs related to the investigation.
One of the most formal and recognized ERM frameworks is the ERM
Integrated Framework promulgated by the COSO. This ERM framework
has broad industry application potential because it was crafted with
principles designed for wide adoption and leaves room for industry or
company specific customization. 112 This framework was selected as the
focal framework for this paper for two reasons. First, it is one of the most
commonly recognized and implemented frameworks due to its design for
123
The
integration and cooperation with the primary COSO framework.
companies
U.S.
primary COSO framework itself is commonly used by
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This is
119. Sara A. Lundqvist, An Exploratory Study of Enterprise Risk Management: Pillars of
ERM, 29 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 393, 396 (2014) (stating the results from one study of ERM:

"41% of firms said they used internally created frameworks solely or in combination with other
frameworks. Of the listed frameworks, the COSO framework was the most followed, with 24%
of firms following COSO solely or in combination with other frameworks. The ISO 31000-2009
and the Basel 11 frameworks both follow with 9% of the firms using them for implementation

guidance either solely or in combination with other frameworks.").
120. Id. at 394; COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 7.
121. Lundqvist supra note 119, at 412.
122. Paape & Spekld, supra note 112, at 548. See generally Lundqvist supra note 119, at 395

(noting that other prominent frameworks include the Joint Australia/New Zealand 4360-2004
Standards, ISO 31000-2009, the Turnbull Guidance, the Casualty Actuarial Society Framework,
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors Framework, and Basel II).

123.

COMM.

OF SPONSORING

ORG.

OF THE TREADWAY

COMM'N,

ENTERPRISE

RISK

MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK: INTEGRATING WITH STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE PRESENTATION 19,
https://www.coso.org/Documents/COSO-ERM-Presentation-September(Sept. 2017),
26
2017.pdf [hereinafter COSO ERM PRESENTATION]. Arguably, the fact that COSO ERM ties in

with an established control framework is a selling point because of the focus, when FCPA was
written, on the drive for corporations to have accurate internal controls. See FCPA Update, supra

note 43, at 244.
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because the SEC rules relating to SOX compliance recommend, through
a form of proxy rulemaking, that companies use either COSO or an
equivalent framework to satisfy regulatory requirements. 124 Second, the
framework, with input through COSO of the Institute of Internal Auditors
(IIA), includes a roadmap for internal audit's role in the risk management
process. The role of internal auditors in ERM is not well understood, and
sometimes overlooked entirely. However, their role is critical if the kind
12 5
of regulatory risks associated with FCPA are to be managed correctly.
No claim is made through this analysis that the COSO ERM Integrated
Framework is the best or most effective ERM option.
C. COSO ERM and the U.K Bribery Act
The U.K. Bribery Act covers any organization incorporated or formed
in the United Kingdom or that carries on a business or part of a business
in the UK.12 6 Guidance published by the Ministry of Justice (U.K.
Guidance) sets out six principles that should inform the procedures put in
place by commercial organizations wishing to prevent bribery being
committed on their behalf. 12 Of these principals, the COSO ERM
framework provides a way for companies to follow principle 3, risk
assessment, and to prepare for principles 4-6, due diligence,
communication, and monitoring. In its application of COSO ERM a
company can also satisfy principle 1, proportionate procedures, and 2, top
level commitment.
Principle 3, risk assessment, is the principle most clearly addressed by
the COSO ERM Framework. Principle 3 asks that "the commercial
organisation assesses the nature and extent of its exposure to potential
external and internal risks of bribery on its behalf by persons associated
with it. The assessment is periodic, informed and documented."' 2 8 This
relates directly with risk appetite and risk tolerance, discussed in Part VI
A. Principles 4-6 are addressed with COSO ERM components (4) review
and revision and (5) information, communication and reporting; these
components are discussed further in the next section.
Principle 1 - proportionate procedures recognizes that not all
companies will use or should use the same anti-bribery frameworks: "A
commercial organisation's procedures to prevent bribery by persons
associated with it are proportionate to the bribery risks it faces and to the
124. Joanna P. Kimbell, How the SEC Makes Rules by Proxy with Sarbanes-Oxley and
COSO 2.0: A PedagogicalNote, 27 S.L.J. 221, 221-222 (2017).
125. See infra Section V.D.2.
126. See generallyBribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2010/23/section/2.; see also Bribery Act 2010 Guidance, at 15, https://www.justice.gov.uk/

downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf [hereinafter Bribery Act Guidance].
127. Id. at 20.
128. Id. at 25.
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nature, scale and complexity of the commercial organisation's activities.
They are also clear, practical, accessible, effectively implemented and
enforced." 129 Since it deals with procedures proportionate to risk, this
principle also relates to COSO ERM's risk appetite and risk tolerance.
Additionally, the U.K. Guidance discusses how the size of a company
may impact procedures; 130 company size as it relates to COSO ERM and
constructing procedures generally are discussed in section D.2. of this
paper, Corporate Governance and Roles. That discussion also relates to
U.K. Guidance principle 2 - top-level commitment. The U.K. Guidance
states that "Whatever the size, structure or market of a commercial
organisation, top-level management commitment to bribery prevention is
likely to include (1) communication of the organisation's anti-bribery
stance, and (2) an appropriate degree of involvement in developing
bribery prevention procedures." 13 1 This paper's discussion of Corporate
Governance and Roles speaks specifically to the idea of an appropriate
degree of involvement.
D. COSO ERM Framework
1. Components
The updated 2017 COSO ERM Framework, as shown in Exhibit 5, is
organized into five components: (1) governance and culture; (2) strategy
and objective-setting; (3) performance; (4) review and revision; and (5)
32 Some of the original
information, communication and reporting.'
framework components are now incorporated in the updated framework
as principles. For example, defining risk appetite is now a principle under
the strategy and objective-setting component, along with evaluating
1 3 3 All
alternative strategies and formulating business objectives.
components are relevant to the management of risks. However, for the
FCPA, particular attention needs to be paid to risk appetite and the
associated risk profile.

129. [d.at21.
130. Id.
131. Id. at23.
132. COSO ERM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 117, at 6. The original COSO ERM
Framework components were: internal environment, which included the company's risk appetite,
objective setting, which covered the company's strategic objectives, event identification, risk
assessment, risk response, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. See
Lundqvist, supra note 119, at 396. One of the reasons for the change in the framework is to
recognize the importance of company culture in influencing/impacting risk management. See
COSO ERM PRESENTATION, supra note 123, at 24
133. COSO ERM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 117, at 10.
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Exhibit 5
COSO ERM Framework-20 Key Principles
34
and the 5 Components1
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2. Corporate Governance and Roles
Risk management should involve a company's board of directors, in
particular the audit committee, company executives/managers, and both

internal and external company auditors.135 While not directly stated in the
FCPA this point is made in guidance to the U.K. Bribery Act. The second
principle in guidance to the U.K. Bribery Act is top-level commitment:
"The top-level management of a commercial organization (be it a board
of directors, the owners or any other equivalent body or persons) are
committed to preventing bribery by persons associated with it. They
foster a culture within the organisation in which bribery is never
36

acceptable." 1
The three lines of accountability under COSO ERM are: (1) core
business; (2) support functions; and (3) assurance functions. 137 The board
of directors is responsible for governance functions associated with ERM
and practices.13 8
culture, capabilities,
management
including
134. COSO ERM PRESENTATION, supra note 123, at 22.
135. See COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 27-43; see COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE
TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENTINTEGRATING WITH STRATEGY AND
PERFORMANCE app. C, 9-16 (2017) [hereinafter COSO ERM app. C]. See generally Lawrence J.
Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The Basics, 52 Akron L. Rev. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-3133818; Lawrence J.Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee
FinancialExpert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L. J. 205
(2013); Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board's Responsibilityfor Director Selection
and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV. 75 (2012).
136. Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 126, at 23.
137. COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 15-16.
138. COSO ERM app. C, supra note 135, at 9 (noting that COSO makes allowances for
different sizes of companies and corresponding organizational/governance structures by defining
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Management includes the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Risk Officer,
1 3 9 The CEO is
Chief Financial Officer, and functional/line management.

accountable to the board of directors and is responsible for overall ERM
culture, capabilities, and operational practices, particular for setting the
"tone from the top."14 The CRO is a second line of accountability for

14 1 Among the ERM
ERM, usually with direct access to the CEO.
used to
associated responsibilities for top management, are the processes
142
risk.
on
report
and
to,
respond
prioritize,
identify, assess,
The final and third line of accountability are the assurance functions,
including auditing. 14 3 Particularly for smaller companies, this third line is

a potential quagmire for implementation of the COSO ERM framework.
Generally, owner-managed companies are less likely to practice ERM.'"
The size of a company can and arguably should be considered when
developing procedures to prevent bribery and small size will not be
laws. 14 5
accepted as an excuse to failure to comply with applicable
Moreover, depending on the nature of its operations a small company can

face significant risks and may in fact need more extensive bribery

6
limited risks.' 4
prevention procedures than larger companies with more
Unfortunately, small companies, just beyond the size of ownermanaged companies, which do use ERM are likely to leave all or most of
department.' 47
the responsibility of the program with the internal audit
Since certain responsibilities related to ERM, such as setting the risk
appetite, must be handled by top management, deligating such a corporate

board of directors to be a board of directors, a supervisory board, trustees and/or general partners,
or dedicated committees).
139. Id. at 12-13.
140. Id. at 12.
141. See id. (clarifying that when there is not a specific CRO role within a given corporate
governance structure the responsibilities can be assigned to a manager in the second line of
accountability).
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 16.
144. Paape & Spekld, supra note 112, at 559.
145. Principle I from the U.K. Guidance discusses company size and its relationship to
crafting procedures: "To a certain extent the level of risk will be linked to the size of the
organization and the nature and complexity of its business, but size will not be the only
determining factor." Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 126, at 21. The small size of a particular
company is not enough to forgive it should it have few or no anti-bribery procedures as illustrated
by the recent case involving Skansen Interiors. See supra notes 132-33, 198-99 and associated
text.
146. Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 126, at 21.
147. See Audrey A. Grammling & Patricia M. Myers, InternalAuditing'sRole in ERM, 63
INTERNAL AUDITOR 52, 56 (2006). See generally Bradley P. Lawson et al., How Do Auditors
Respond to FCPA Risk? (Nov. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (claiming that auditors'
response to FCPA risk is strongest among smaller clients and that this may be driven by smaller
clients, faced with barriers to entry in international markets, being more incentivized to engage in
2
illegal activity than large firms), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3127 65.
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governance decision to the internal audit function becomes a grave error
and trap. 148 It is inappropriate for auditors, who are tasked with an
assurance role, to assume management responsibilities. 149 Still, the
importance of auditors to FCPA compliance cannot be underrated.
Prosecuting illegal activity under the FCPA accounting records
provisions is easier than prosecuting under the anti-bribery provisions. 150
Of 278 FCPA enforcement actions, 90% involved accounting
provisions. 151 Because of the specialized relevant knowledge they bring,
auditors play a critical role in FCPA compliance. 152 The key is for
auditors to contribute to compliance appropriately. Details of ERM
roles/responsibilities for internal audit are detailed in Exhibit 6 below.
Exhibit 6
Summary of Internal Audit Roles related to ERM 153
Core Internal
Auditing Roles

Legitimate Internal
Auditing Roles

What Internal Audit
Shouldn't Do

-Give assurance on risk
management process

-Facilitate identification and
evaluations of risks

-Set the risk appetite

-Give assurance that risks
are evaluated correctly

-Coach management in
responding to risks

-Impose risk management
processes

-Evaluate risk management
processes
-Evaluate the reporting of

-Coordinate ERM activities

-Provide management
assurance on risks
-Make decisions on risk
responses
-Implement risk responses
on management's behalf
-Have accountability for risk
management

key risks
-Review the management
of key risks

-Maintain and develop ERM
framework
-Champion establishment of
ERM
-Develop risk management
strategy for Board approval

As discussed previously, auditors have a specific view of risk, 5 4 one
that is insufficient for the holistic approach needed for ERM. Auditors
also do not have the expertise to conduct unaided risk identification or
analysis, because they are not involved in the company's strategy and
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Gramling & Myers, supra note 147, at 55.
Id.
Lawson et al., supra note 147, at 2.
Id.
Id.
See Gramling & Myers, supra note 147, at 56-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
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operations at the level of top management. This is not to say that internal
1 5 5 but rather to caution
audit can't champion or coordinate ERM efforts,
companies about where lines of responsibility are drawn. Since FCPA
enforcement is a profoundly important regulatory risk and strategic issue,
ultimate responsibility for analyzing these risks belongs to top
executives.
V. APPLICATION OF THE Coso ERM FRAMEWORK To FCPA AND U.K.
BRIBERY ACT 2010
A. Risk Appetite andRisk Tolerance
Under the updated COSO 2017 framework, guidance is provided for
building a visual risk profile that includes risk, performance, risk appetite
and risk capacity, with the goal of offering a comprehensive view of risk
5 6 Risk appetite is
and enabling more risk-aware decision making.'
considered a crucial part of the ERM process and is frequently analyzed
and discussed by those conversant and interested in the merits of risk
management. 157 Risk appetite is the amount of risk a company is willing
8
to accept in pursuit of value. 15 It expresses the company's risk value at
the macro company level and should be an aggregation of the risks of
specific company objectives. 159 Under COSO ERM, this aggregation can
6 0 It is a reflection of the
be expressed quantitatively or qualitatively.
reality that the company seeks to optimize a range of possible
outcomes. 16' At the specific,62individual objective level, the expression of
risk should be quantitative. 1
In addition to defining and understanding its appetite and risk
tolerance, the company must also have some knowledge of risks in the
155. The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management, supra note 108, at 41-42
("Proponents of ERM agree that firms choosing to adopt an ERM strategy need a person or group
of persons responsible for the coordination of the ERM program and the communication of goals
and results to the board. The responsible party or group also needs to promote ERM to
management and elevate the risk management function to one that informs the firm's overall
corporate and financial strategy. However, consensus is lacking on the structure or body that is
best suited to implement and manage a firm's ERM program.").
156. COSO ERM PRESENTATION, supra note 123, at 23.

Lundqvist, supra note 119, at 396; Paape & Spekld, supranote 112, at 549.
COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 19.
Paape & Spekld, supra note 112, at 549.
Id.
161. See COSO ERM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 117, at I ("As we seek to optimize
a range of possible outcomes, decisions are rarely binary, with a right and wrong answer. That's
why [ERM] may be called both an art and a science.").
162. See Paape & Spekle, supra note 112, at 549; see also COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 40
(explaining that at this more finely granulated level of analysis COSO conveys a clear preference
for quantification: "risk tolerances can be measured, and often are best measured in the same units
as the related objectives").
157.
158.
159.
160.
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external environment to complete a risk profile. In the case of FCPArelated issues, this includes studying FCPA violations by other
companies and trends in the company's industry. 16 3 Investigations and
enforcement actions by the government and government publications and
guidance about such actions may also offer useful information to
management attempting to establish the company's risk appetite.164 For
compliance with the U.K. Bribery Act, specifically principle 3, risk
assessment is helpful in beginning an external analysis. The commentary
to the principle points companies to five broad groups for beginning an
external risk analysis: country, sectoral, transaction, business
65
opportunity, and business partnership. 1
There is further reason for conducting such an external analysis. In
addition to being part of the ERM framework, an analysis that includes
knowledge of the external risk environment and risk assessment is
considered by the government to be an essential part of an FCPA
compliance program. 166 It is consistent with the principles of the U.K.
Bribery Act Guidance, meaning that it is one factor the SFO will consider
when deciding whether or not to take action against a company. 167
The DPA is presenting new challenges to completing an external
analysis both by acting as a new information source and by, in some
cases, contradicting the other sources. It is important to understand what
this tool is and how it complicates the analysis process by "denying us
precedent-setting and ambiguity-reducing court interpretations.', 16 8

163. For example, the ACFE's 2018 Report to the Nations noted that the industries with the
highest proportion of corruption cases were Energy (53%), Manufacturing (51%) and
Government and Public Administration (50%). Percentages are the amount of occupational fraud
cases in each industry that could be classified more specifically as corruption cases. See ACFE
REPORT TO THE NATIONS , supra note 27, at 23.
164. See Goelzer, supra note 89, at 294 (emphasizing the need to learn the location, nature
and scope of foreign operations and the usefulness of government filings, news articles and other
published sources of information in beginning that analysis).
165. Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 126, at 26.
166. If because of the nature of an organization's business there is a substantial risk that
certain types of offenses may occur, management must have taken steps to prevent and detect
those types of offenses. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, app. n.3(k)(iii) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMMN 2018).

167. Bribery Act Guidance, supranote 126, at 26.
168. Salbu, supra note 80, at 493.
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B. Risk Profile
The first step in building a risk profile is plotting the risk appetite for
169 For
a particular strategic objective as a straight horizontal line.
in China. 170
example, consider the establishment of business operations
If the company determines there is an estimated risk that bribes will be
expected or demanded and the FCPA or U.K. Bribery Act violated if the
company complies with that expectation or demand-then, as shown in
Exhibit 7, a curve is generated showing the possible combinations of risk
to performance. This curve slopes up to the right as a reflection of the
reality that as performance increases, so does risk. In our FCPA example
performance could be measured as the number of contacts made with
individuals expecting or demanding payments that would violate the
FCPA. At some point the curve will intersect the risk appetite line; at any
point beyond that intersection the level of risk driven by the particular
171 DPAs are
level of performance exceeds the company's risk appetite.
discussed in Section VII.

169. The constant slope of the line is an indication of that the risk appetite for the objective
remains constant for all levels of performance. See COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 20.

170. China presents as a good example for a number of reasons. First, the trade relationship
between the U.S. and China is a powerful influencing factor in U.S. trade generally. Second,
certain aspects of Chinese culture centered around gift-giving increase the risk of FCPA
violations, as a culturally expected and legally acceptable gift in China could be treated as a bribe
under the FCPA. See generally Mary Szto, Chinese Gi giving, Anti-corruptionLaw, and the Rule
of Law and Virtue, 39 Fordham Int'l L.J. 591 (2016) (tracing the history of Chinese gift-giving
and discussing how the FCPA may clash with traditional beliefs and gift-giving trigger FCPA

violations). Third, the recent crackdown on corruption in China presents the opportunity to discuss
the need for separate risks analysis for compliance in each country, home and international, in the
case of our example USA and China. See infra text accompanying notes 195-97. Fourth, as the

possibility of a trade war with China brings analysis of companies' strategic plans for operations
in and with that country into sharper focus, the opportunity to examine or reexamine FCPA
compliance issues naturally evolves.
171. See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT- INTEGRATING WITH STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE app. D, 20 (2017) [hereinafter
COSO ERM app. D].
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Exhibit 7
172
COSO ERM Framework Risk Profile
Toalerance

Tarcet

Performance

Next, the company plots vertically what its expected performance
level will be. This performance level is based on setting strategic
objectives and studying the risk profile. 173 The company then sets its risk
p~~~~~
i haround
ide the performance
eae ~~erformance
oti target
ocp with4steie
74
tolerance,
a zone
an upwardhtpol
bound of
the intersection between the risk appetite and the risk/performance curve.
Note that this is the identification of what level of performance the
company is willing to accept; it is not a zone of risk. Managers and
strategists can associate the lower and upper bounds of this zone with the
idea of determining worst and best-case scenarios with expected

expected monetary values but rather to maximize expected utility.pfa
Utility is greater than the expected monetary value of a strategic
objective, encompassing intrinsic value that is personal to the
individual/company making the decision. 17 Tolerance is related to cost;
172. COSO ERM PRESENTATION, supra note 123, at 23.
173. See COSO ERM app. D, supra note 171, at 21.
174. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44-49 (6th ed. 2012).
175. see ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 61 (Liberty Fund 2011) (8th ed.

1920) ("Utility is taken to
he correlative to Desire or Want. It has been already argued that desires
cannot be measured directly, but only indirectly by the outward phenomena to which they give
rise: and that in te
a
th which economics is chiefly concerned the measure is found in
the price which a person is willing to pay for the fulfilment or satisfaction of his desire."),
http://fles.Libertyfund.org/files/ 676/Marshall01 97_EBk_v6.0.pdf.
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the cost of achieving
generally, the narrower the tolerance, the greater
176
level.
tolerance
the
actual performance within
Also related to cost is the company's risk capacity. Risk capacity is
the maximum amount of risk an entity can absorb in pursuit of its
objectives. 177 Depending on the entity and the particular objective being
analyzed, the risk capacity may be described in either qualitative or
quantitative terms. 178 For FCPA compliance, issues setting a quantitative
risk capacity could include: the expense of regular audits and continuous
monitoring for violations, potential costs to the company for conducting
an internal investigation if there is a charge of a violation and, cost
estimates of any fines and future compliance if the company is prosecuted
or agrees to a DPA. 179 For example, the cost of operating or outsourcing
operation of an anonymous tip hotline might be included. According to
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2018 Report to the Nations,
1 80
50% of company corruption cases in 2018 were detected by a tip. Note
that this level is not tied to the probability of the company being caught
violating the FCPA; an issue that is incorporated in the risk appetite. The
reason the risk appetite is less than the risk capacity is that organizations
18 1
generally strive to hold their risk appetite within the risk capacity -we
should not be willing to take on more risk than what we can afford. This
risk profile gives the company a visual cost benefit analysis. In the case
of FCPA related strategic objectives, this analysis can help a company
determine if the best strategy is to avoid taking the risk, even if the
company could conceivably afford it.
C. Sources of Informationfor ExternalAnalysis
Some FCPA specific sources of information relevant to conducting
the external analysis for the risk profile include corrupt practices acts or
laws of other nations. FCPA guidance issued by the federal government
in 2012, DPAs, and remarks by the current U.S. presidential
176.
177.
178.
179.

COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 63.
Id. at 49.
Id.
It must be noted that in this stage of the analysis there will be an important difference

in cost estimates between companies that have not previously violated the FCPA and companies
that have-generally, the cost of compliance for a previous violator will be higher. It has been
found that auditors' fees for public companies that are FCPA violators are higher than for nonviolators, this premium fee existing across all relevant periods: the violation period, the
investigation period, the regulatory proceedings period, and the post proceedings period. See
Lawson et al., supra note 147, at 3. How the experience of FCPA investigation and regulatory
proceedings affect the violator company's perception of FCPA compliance should be reflected in

the risk appetite.
180. See ACFE REPORT TO THE NATIONS, supra note 27, at 13.

181. See COSO ERM, supra note 91, at 49. However, general procedures exist for when
there is an exception and risk appetite exceeds capacity. See id.
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administration, are also important. The first two sources have limited use
and will be briefly addressed here. DPAs deserve more time and attention
for two reasons. First, the specificity of information DPAs can provide
for risk profiles as to risk levels for specific countries and costs related to
investigations and fines. Secondly, the growing criticism of the use of
DPAs is informative of the legal environment around FCPA issues at
present. Remarks about the FCPA made by the current administration are
discussed following the section on DPAs. Ultimately, the most beneficial
information for an external analysis is a study of trends in current
enforcement such as the information provided in this paper. 82
In 2012 the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the "Resource Guide to the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act."' 18 3 The Guidance is a useful collection of
some FCPA related information including the complete text of the Act
1 84
and summaries of previously issued guidelines and related laws.

However, the usefulness of the Guidance is limited. As the disclaimer in
the forward of the Guidance itself makes clear, it is not law. 185 Rather, it
represented the DOJ and SEC's publicly released interpretation of the law
at the time the Guidance was released, in the form of "enforcement
approach and priorities."' 186 Evidence of this is the fact that the DOJ,
despite expectations based on information in the guidance, has privately
or publicly declined to pursue some charges of FCPA violations; 187 in
other words, enforcement approaches and priorities have and will
change.' 88 Because it is not law, the Guidance should not be relied on as
89
a source of absolute information. 1

This may be contrasted with the intent and purpose and therefore the
potential usefulness of the U.K. Bribery Act Guidance. The one defense
offered under the Act is having "adequate procedures" in place. 190
"Adequate procedures" is not defined in the Act, and Section 9 of the Act
states that "The Secretary of State must publish guidance about
procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to
prevent persons associated with them from bribing as mentioned in
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra Section III.B.
FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 96.
See generally id.
Seeid. ati.
Id.
Mike Koehler, Grading the ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct Guidance, 7 WHITE COLLAR
CRIME REP. 961, 968 (2012).
188. See supratext accompanying note 55-59.

189. See Koehler, supra note 187, at 965, 967 (noting there is also some doubt about how
accurately the Guidance represented DOJ and SEC enforcement approaches and priorities at the
time of its release).
190. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/

section/2.
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section 7(1)."' 191 The U.K. Guidance from the Ministry of Justice answers
that requirement of published guidance, with the six principles that have
been discussed in context of explaining the COSO ERM framework in
this paper.1 92 The U. K. Guidance also clarified the standard of proof: "in
accordance with established case law, the standard of proof which the
commercial organization would need to discharge in order to prove the
1 93
of probabilities."'
defense, in the event it was prosecuted, is the balance
In the first case where a jury considered the "adequate procedures"
defense, the company, Skansen Interiors, argued that it had satisfied the
"adequate procedures requirement" and that because of the company's
small size and limited geographic reach the company did not need
sophisticated procedures, that no detailed policy on preventing bribery
was necessary because it should be common sense and the company had
a general ethics policy, and that existing controls such as standard form
194
clauses relating to bribery in contracts should have been sufficient. The
jury was not convinced that the requirements of the defense were met and
returned a guilty verdict. In reviewing the presented defense and the
verdict, attorneys from Baker McKenzie suggest that the problem with
the defense was that it demonstrated a procedure the Guidance refused to
follow:
The Ministry of Justice Guidance.. .repeatedly makes clear
that adequate bribery prevention procedures only need to be
proportionate to the bribery risks that an organization faces.
More specifically, the guidance notes that if an organization
is small or medium sized "the application of the principles is
likely to suggest procedures that are different from those that
may be right for a large multinational organisation" and that
"[t]o a certain extent the level of risk will be linked to the
size of the organisation and the nature and complexity of its
business, but size will not be the only determining factor."
Clearly in this case the jury did not consider that the steps
Skansen had taken to prevent bribery were adequate, despite
the small size of the company and its limited geographical
reach. The case therefore serves as a reminder to small and
medium sized companies to ensure that a rigorous risk
assessment is conducted in relation to bribery risks and
robust procedures are in place to deal with those risks that
comply with the six guiding principles set out in the Ministry
of Justice's Guidance... The case also highlights the
191. Id. § 9(1).
192. See discussion supra Section V.C.
193. Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 126, at 15.
194. Joanna Ludlam et al., UK: "Adequate Procedures" and Self Reporting Under the
Spotlight as Jury Rejects Section 7 Defence, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://globalcompliancenews.com/adequate-procedures-rejects-defence-20180313/.
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importance of documenting steps taken to implement
"adequate procedures", irrespective of the size of the
organisation, even if the conclusion is that there is no need
for a policy (although that conclusion is likely to be rare for
most companies). For all companies, large and small, the
case suggests that, when it comes to considering adequate
procedures, juries will give short shrift to ineffective policies
and procedures that are not designed to target the considered
bribery risks faced by the company and/or are not properly
documented and communicated. 1 9 5
A company must be familiar with the laws of a nation in which it will
conduct business, including any laws related to bribery and corruption, if
it hopes to maintain operations in that country for long. It could seem that,
in the interests of efficiency, a company doing business in multiple
nations and operating under multiple anti-bribery/anti-corruption laws
should simply follow the most stringent of the several laws, both for
operations and to conduct a risk analysis. In fact, a company cannot
shortcut its analysis in this way because different anti-bribery/anticorruption laws, even when seemingly similar upon initial review, may
in fact define and address company actions in very different ways.
Differences between the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act have been
highlighted, but they are not isolated instances. Take for example the antibribery provision in China's law, PRC Criminal Law article 385, which
prohibits giving money or property to state functionaries. As explained
by attorney Daniel Chow:
This provision and others show a focus on tangible financial
assets acquired and owned by a state official. By contrast,
the giving of benefits to state functionary that are not in the
form of tangible financial assets are outside the scope of
these laws and are not prohibited. The Party does not seem
to find intangible benefits to be a concern. Under the FCPA,
however, it is illegal to make a payment of money, gift, or
"anything of value." The term "anything of value"
can
encompass gifts of an intangible nature and is not limited to
money or property. Cases that involve intangible benefits
might trigger liability under the FCPA. 196
A company looking only at enforcement under China's law may
therefore engage in activities that would violate the FCPA. Studying one
195. Id.
196. Daniel C.K. Chow, China's Anti-Corruption Crackdown and the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 5 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 323, 334 (2018); see Scott Shackelford, Welcome to the
'Managed' Internet, Asia & Pac. Pol'y Forum (June 15, 2017), https://www.policyforum.net/
welcome-managed-internet/; Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneurin China: Potholes
on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PRop. L. 427, 490 (2012).
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nation's law is no substitute for studying another's, rather, the risk of
investigation and prosecution under each law comprise a list of individual
197 and, in situations where a
risks, each to be analyzed separately
actions may be covered by the laws of multiple countries,
company's
98

jointly.'

VI. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING ENFORCEMENT

In addition to considering FCPA risks when planning and analyzing
company risk, generally, organizations should be prepared to analyze a
related, different set of risks if there are charges of FCPA violations. The
company needs to decide first of all if it is worth the time and money
challenging the charge. Additionally, companies should consider the
alternatives to regulatory enforcement that are now used for FCPA
violations, particularly DPAs.
A. Chances of Winning an FCPA Enforcement Challenge
From a purely technical point, businesses can challenge enforcement
through existing procedures. But, when a company seeks to answer the
question of 'can we' it approaches not technically, but practically. In
other words, the 'can' question for a business is really a question of "can
we afford to" or "can we afford not to" not "does a procedure for
challenging this exist in the legal system." Each risk identified by a
ERM approach
company is subject to a cost-benefit analysis and when an199
is used, the impact of all risks is handled like a portfolio. This analysis
197. An additional risk component associated with anti-bribery/anti-corruption laws in other
countries is the prime rationale/motivation for enforcement. For example, critics of China
President Xi claim the purpose of China's current anti-bribery/anti-corruption campaign "is not
to rid the Party of corruption but to rid the State of Xi's enemies and rivals." Chow, supra note
196, at 327, text accompanying note 38. Thus, it would seem that enforcement under the China
law may be less an issue of the actions of the company and more a consequence of which
official(s) the company bribes. This additional element of unpredictability adds an additional
challenge to risk assessment of compliance with China's law.
198. As an example, actions by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited were
covered by both the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act. The company entered into a DPA with the
U.K. in November, 2015. Costantino Grasso, Peaks and Troughs of the UK. Deferred
Prosecution Agreement: The Lesson Learnedfrom the First-Ever DPA between the SF0 and
ICBC SB PLC, 5 J.Bus. L. 388, 401 (2016) Settlement with the U.K. does not exclude the
possibility of prosecution in the US, however in this case and agreement was reached between the
U.K.'s SFO and the U.S. DOJ in which the DOJ stated that if the matter was resolved in the U.K.
the inquiry would be closed in the US. See id. at 406. This suggests that in addition to knowing
the laws of the separate countries companies may also need to know the status and nature of the
relationship between the governments of those countries. See id. This suggests that in addition to
knowing the laws of the separate countries companies may also need to know the status and nature
of the relationship between the governments of those countries.
199. The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management, supra note 108, at 39 ("An
enterprise-wide approach to risk management treats each of these risk classes as part of the firm's
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is more complex for some risks than others, particularly for risks outside
of changes in currencies, interest rates, and commodity prices.2" 0
Managers/executives inside the company understand these risks, but
because there is no full understanding of or access to their information
generally, there is no market to measure those risks.20 '
For a company to determine whether to challenge the government's
charge that the company violated the FCPA, the company must conclude
that the benefits from such a challenge will exceed the cost and thereby
increase the total value of the company, or that the company's
stakeholders will ultimately benefit from such challenge.20 2 One FCPA
legal analyst has argued that a potential benefit of multiple companies
challenging FCPA enforcement would be a change in the expansive
enforcement landscape. 20 3 Given the focus of most companies on value
maximization and stakeholders it is unlikely that such a suppositional
benefit would motivate a challenge.20 4 What could motivate a company

overall risk portfolio that is managed holistically."); Nocco & Stulz, supra note 107, at 11
("Management's job is rather to optimize the firm's risk portfolio by trading off the probability of
large shortfalls and the associated costs with the expected gains from taking or retaining risks.").
200. Nocco & Stulz, supra note 107, at 9 ("[C]ompanies in the course of their normal
activities take many strategic or business risks that they cannot profitably lay off in capital markets
or other developed risk transfer markets.").
201. Id.
202. This is a simplification and summary of some of the dominant management theories,
namely value maximization, stakeholder theory and enlightened value maximization. Value
maximization theory operates with the simple core belief that whatever increases the long-term
market value of the company is what is in the company's best interest. Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q.,
235, 236 (2002). All decisions should be made based on that core belief so that the total value of
the company, the sum of the values of all financial claims on the company, is increased. See id.
Stakeholder theory argues that managers should make decisions that take into account all the
stakeholders of the company. Id. Stakeholders are groups and individuals with the power to affect
the company's performance and/or a stake in the company's performance. See id. Traditional
groups of stakeholders are customers, investors, regulators, employees, suppliers, and the
community. Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and
Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 408 (1995). Enlightened value maximization is similar
to stakeholder theory but adds in some specification for the other theory's criterion, ultimately
acknowledging that focus on maximization of the long-run value of the company will require
making tradeoffs between stakeholders. Jensen, supra,at 351.
203. See Mike Koehler, Ten Seldom Discussed Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Facts That
You Need to Know, 10 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 347, 353 (2015).

204. A company will challenge enforcement if it's in the company's best interest to do so,
consistent with one of the theories mentioned in COSO ERM Appendices. See COSO ERM app.
D, supra note 171, at 24-25 (discussing possible responses to risk including accept, avoid, pursue,
reduce, and share). Any argument about a company championing justice by taking on expansive
enforcement is unlikely to cause the benefits of the fight to outweigh the costs or to motivate a
company to action if there is not already a net benefit. Put another way, a company is not going
to engage in a fight for the principle of the thing; a company will only join a battle if it makes the
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is an understanding of the risk involved, specifically the probability of
winning a challenge against the government.
As noted by Koehler, the government has been successful in
negotiating FCPA related settlement agreements but not in winning
corporate enforcement actions when challenged by companies:
" the Department of Justice (DOJ) is 0-2 in corporate
enforcement actions when put to its ultimate burden
of proof;
*

the DOJ has an overall losing record in individual
enforcement actions when put to its ultimate burden
of proof;

" the Securities Exchange Commission has never
to its
prevailed in an enforcement
20 5 action when put
proof.
of
burden
ultimate
This information suggests that so long as a company is convinced that
charges of FCPA violations against it are baseless, a challenge of
enforcement stands a chance of success. Every case is different, and the
risks related to each should be examined individually. With the current
information regarding successful enforcement challenges, attorneys have
counsel companies about risks related to
information that can help them
20 6
case.
specific
a
in
challenge
a
B. DPAs and the FCPA
Related to FCPA enforcement, companies should also be aware of the
20 7
and since
history and uses of DPAs. DPAs have existed for decades,
law
corporate
of
tool
accepted
commonly
a
become
the early 1990s have
20 8
NPAs
corporate
of
decade
past
the
enforcement policy. In discussing
and DPAs, law firm Gibson Dunn observes:
What a decade it has been. In our time analyzing and
reporting on these resolutions, we have seen the pendulum
company money. To expect otherwise is to ask a company to step outside its role and flout most
stakeholder expectations.
205. Koehler, supranote 203, at 353.
206. See generally Mike Koehler, What PercentageofDOJFCPALosses is Acceptable?, 90
CRIM. L. REP. 823 (2012) (discussing the Africa Sting enforcement action, the Lindsey
Manufacturing enforcement action and the John O'Shea enforcement action).
207. See Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements on ForeignCorruptPracticesAct Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
497, 502 (2015) [hereinafter Measuring the Impact of NPAs and DPAs] (describing origins of
DPAs and NPAs).

208. Reilly, supranote 59, at 841, 844; see Measuringthe Impact of NPAs and DPAs, supra
note 207, at 516-21 (showing a list of DOJ enforcement actions and the applied form of resolution
from December 2004 to 2014).
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swing from 22 agreements concluded in a single year (in
2009 and 2017), to a high of 102 agreements (in 2015)-a
yield that surprised even the enforcement agencies executing
them. We also have seen greater standardization of certain
agreement terms as enforcement agency experience has
developed, removal of certain terms-like mandatory
privilege waivers-as prosecutorial policy has evolved, and
application to an ever-widening scope of laws and conduct.
In a testament to the efficacy of DPAs in addressing
allegations of corporate misconduct, we also have watched
as countries around the globe have moved toward
formalizing processes to adopt similar agreements...
The Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "the Department") has
entered into 12 agreements thus far in 2018, of which six are
NPAs and six are DPAs. The Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "the Commission") has not entered
into any NPAs or DPAs this year. This year's 12 agreements
to date represent an increase of three agreements from what
we saw at this point in 2017, when there were nine
agreements. It is also early in 2018, and there are many
investigations in the enforcement pipeline that may provide
additional resolutions in the coming months.2 °9
The agreements have been used for many different forms of white
collar crime including FCPA violations. 2 10 As shown by Exhibit 8, there
are clear advantages and disadvantage of using this legal tool.

209. See Memorandum from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP to Clients and Friends, 2018

Mid-Year Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements I (Jully 10, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-mid-year-npa-dpa-update/
[hereinafter Gibson Dunn 2018 NPA/DPA Update].
210. See Reilly, supra note 59, at 841. ("The agreements have been used to address many

different kinds of matters-including various fraud and trade offenses, as well as allegations of
wrongdoing under the False Claims Act, the Controlled Substances Act, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, and the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.").
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Exhibit 8
of DPAs 211
Summary table: Advantages and disadvantages
Disadvantages

Advantages

individuals

for

-Quick and efficient settlement

-Prosecution of fewer
corporate wrongdoing

-Mandate corporate compliance and
internal reform measures

-Possible abuse and exploitation by the
government due to superior bargaining power

-Impose monetary penalties and restitution
on company

-Lack of government training and expertise in
crafting appropriate provisions

-Company funding of internal
investigations/independent monitor

-Government focus shifted to reform and
regulation instead of prosecution

-Company avoidance of some federal
indictment consequences like exclusion
from future government contracting

corporate criminal
address
to
-Use
misconduct fails to conform to the rule of law

-Company avoidance of consequences to
innocent third parties (employees,
shareholders, etc.)

-Questionable achievement of objectives

-Company acknowledgment of
wrongdoing
-Company agreement to cooperate with
government investigations

-Process lacks transparency

Several of the disadvantages are related: possible abuse and
exploitation, lack of government training and expertise, failure to
conform with the rule of law, and lack of transparency. These
disadvantages can be measured quantitatively and qualitatively. First, the
quantitative view, which is based on the idea that in a legal system
founded on the rule of law, a meaningful measurement of government
enforcement success is "prevailing in the context of an adversarial system
when put to the burden of proof., 212 In this context that would mean
examining the Department of Justice and SEC's records in defending

211. See generally Reilly, supra note 59, at 842-43.
212. Koehler, supra note 203, at 353.
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corporate enforcement actions. 2 13 Applying such a quantitative measure
reveals instances of possible abuse and exploitation and lack of
government training and expertise in the enforcement of FCPA
violations. 21 4 Exhibit 9 depicts all known corporate NPAs and DPAs
since 2000.215
Exhibit 9
2 16
Corporate NPAs and DPAs, 2000-2018 YTD
.I./-U
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Note: The SEC entered into ten of the above corporate NPAs and DPAs: 2010 (I),
2011 (3), 2012 (1,2013 (1), 2014 (1), 2015(1), and 2016 (2).
Source: Gibson Dunn, SEC & DOJ

The lack of transparency stems in part from the second issue with
DPAs mentioned above: they can contradict the other sources of
information normally used to craft the risk appetite, namely government
publications or guidance. Government guidance suggests that so long as
a company conducts a reasonable cost/benefit analysis of FCPA violation
risks and can prove such an analysis was done, that analysis will be
respected. Actual DPAs and court rulings suggest otherwise.2 1 7 Further
complicating the issue is the lack of precedent that results from the use of
DPAs. Because DPAs are private agreements between individual
companies and the government, they do not constitute binding precedent
for future cases. Therefore, any definition or delineation of "reasonable"
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
guidance

Id.
Id.
See Gibson Dunn 2018 NPA/DPA Update, supra note 209, at 2.
Id.
See id. (noting that the SEC's comments about "reasonable" cost-benefit analysis in
contrasts with its application a strict liability standard in some enforcement actions).
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used in reference to a cost/benefit analysis in a DPA cannot be used to
measure or judge the reasonableness of cost/benefit analyses used by
other companies in an effort manage their own FCPA violation risks.
Given the limited use of DPAs for future cases a question is raised about
how effective the tool is in furthering justice. In fact there may be other
reasons why enforcement agencies opt to use DPAs and the related NPAs.
As Salbu notes:
Considering the challenges of addressing cross-border criminal
activity, it is not surprising that enforcement agencies seek innovative
ways to be efficient and effective in their work. By employing DPAs and
NPAs, the DOJ no longer needs to invest time and effort establishing a
case meeting the criminal law's high standard of proof to pursue
aggressively a suspected FCPA violator. Instead, the department can cast
the intimidating shadow of risky and expensive investigation and
prosecution, and hope that companies will self-selectively "out"
themselves as violators by agreeing to the compromise processes of
DPAs or NPAs.218
Also notable is the limited judicial review of DPAs. The judicial
branch treats this regulatory tool with skepticism but has been limited in
its ability to act or react. 219 In United States v. Fokker Services, B. V, the
judge declined to approve the negotiated DPA, claiming that to accept
such an agreement would "...undermine the public's confidence in the
administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law ... .220 The

appellate court vacated that ruling and claimed that the district court
221
overstepped its authority when it vacated the DPA. The claim has been
made that the appellate court relied on the Separation of Powers doctrine
in making its decision. 222 In fact, the appellate court ruling calls into
question maintenance of the checks and balances system associated with
223 Exhibit 10 shows total
separation of powers and the rule of law.
218. See Salbu, supra note 80, at 490-91.
219. See Gibson Dunn 2018 NPA/DPA Update, supra note 209, at 2.

220. U.S.v. Fokker Services B. V.,79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated,818 F.3d

733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
221. US. v. Fokker Services B. V, 818 F.3d 733, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
222. See Mark A. Rush et al., BNA Insights: Imbalance of Power: Federal Prosecutors
'Nearly UnilateralDiscretionto Resolve Allegations of CorporateMisconduct After D.C. Circuit
PanelOverrules DistrictCourt's Rejection ofDeferred ProsecutionAgreement in U.S. v. Fokker,

48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1005, 1005 (2016).
223. The question of whether or not current enforcement actions of the FCPA are consistent
with the rule of law was raised by Koehler in the context of reviewing the DOJ and SEC's losing
record in enforcement actions. See Koehler, supra note 203, at 353 (arguing that the quantity of
FCPA enforcement actions is not a meaningful measure of success in a legal system founded on
the rule of law, and that success instead should be judged based on the government's success or
lack thereof in prevailing when put to the burden of proof). Perhaps the more pressing FCPA rule
of law question is the one presented by the Fokker case, as the case brings the question of
supra note 222, at 1005. See generally
separation of powers clearly into focus. See Rush et al,
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monetary recoveries from NPAs and DPAs covering the period from
2000 through July 10, 2018.224
Exhibit 10
Total Monetary Recoveries Related to NPAs and DPAs,
225
2000-2018 YTD

$10.0
$9.0
$7.0

9 $6.0$6
$4.0
$3.0
$2.0

$.

$1.0

Source: Gibson Dunn, SEC & DOJ

While the history of DPAs in the U.K. is much shorter,226 there is a
particular difference between U.K. and U.S. DPAs that warrants noting
at this point and possibly studying in the future, with continued use and
applications of DPAs. In the U.K., DPAprocedure establishes judicial
control not once but twice in the process. 2y Grasso notes that the Crown
Court can be involved in both a "preliminary phase" after the
commencement of DPA negotiations but before the terms are agreed and
a "ratifying phase" once the prosecutor and the company have agreed to
terms.228 On the surface it seems this may have directly solved the lack
of judicial involvement in the U.S. DPA process, 229 an issue particularly
apparent in light of Fokker.230 However, this judicial power may be
Paul R. Verkuil, SeparationofPowers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 Wm. &

Mary L. Rev. 301 (1988) (explaining generally the relationship between the doctrinal concepts of
separation of powers and the rule of law).
224. See Gibson Dunn 2018 NPA/DPA Update, supra note 209, at 2.
225. Id.
226. DPAs were introduced into the English legal system in 2013. See Grasso, supra note
198, at 12. As of March 2018, the SFO had agreed to four DPAs with companies that self-reported
misconduct. See Ludlam et al., supra note 195.
227. See Grasso, supra note 198, at 14.
228. Id. at 14-15.
229. Id. at 15.
230. See supra notes 223-27 and associated text for discussion of Fokker.
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limited by the language of the regulation. As Grasso notes, in the
preliminary phase:
... if the court disagrees with a prosecutor over the way
the negotiations have been conducted, it has the possibility
to offer general directions only giving reasons after having
declined to make the requested declaration... It would
probably have been preferable if the legislature had provided
two distinct forms of judicial involvement: the first one
designed to offer prosecutors directives, specifically tailored
to the presented case, on hot to conduct negotiations in the
interest of justice; the second one aimed to ratify the
agreement after it has been reached following the abovementioned instructions.2 3 '
The history of DPAs and FCPA enforcement gives a muddy picture
at best of the effectiveness of the legal tool both in terms of infallibility
and consummation of the FCPA's original goals on an individual case
basis and in broader terms of the impact on the relationship between the
executive and judicial branches of the government. At best it can be said
that in terms of FCPA enforcement DPAs are part of the present reality
and companies subject to FCPA enforcement should therefore be aware
of their existence and use.
VII.

OTHER CURRENT

FCPA ISSUES:

CYBER CHALLENGES AND

ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

A. Emergence of Cyber Challenges
By now, any attempt to cover the subject of bribery and corruption
must include the impact of post-Internet technology and social media.
The FCPA is now over forty years old. A rapidly growing and highly
significant area of risk that has not been noted sufficiently in the anticorruption literature to date is the emergence of organized crime and
232
These
nation state actors operating through the use of cyber tools.
cyber threats include such technological advances as: the onion router
234 and websites on the dark
(tor);2 33 bitcoin and other virtual currencies;
231. See Grasso, supra note 198, at 15.
232. Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next PearlHarbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
233, 261 (2016).
233. Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies:Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve,
Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 15 (2014).
234. Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and
Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQUETrE L. REV. 447 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin
Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041
(2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial
Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 232 (2016).
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web that serve as electronic marketplaces for criminal activities and
23 5
supplies.

A deep dive into the numerous issues surrounding: corporate
governance and responsibility to protect against cyber breach,236
cybersecurity defense involving U.S. industry and government; 237 theft
of intellectual property schemes via or involving cyber; 238 ransomware
and other payment extortion which may fall under anti-money laundering
or corrupt payment schemes, 239 is all beyond the scope of this single
journal article. However; many helpful resources are available elsewhere,
as indicated in our footnotes.
B. Enforcement Under the Trump Administration
As this Article nears publication, ample news coverage depicts
numerous accounts of alleged money laundering by former high level
Trump Administration officials. 240 For several years prior to the 2016
U.S. presidential election, citizen Donald Trump had voiced his
235. David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web and Employer Liability (Sept.
2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid
=3251479.
236. Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors' and Officers'
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2017);
Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons from
Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018) Lawrence J. Trautman, The
Board's Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS Bus. L. J. 275 (2017); Lawrence J.
Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer
Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM & MARY Bus.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Law Operates in a Wired Global
Society: Cyber and E-Commerce Risk, PROCEEDS OF THE KOREA LEGISLATION RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (KLRI), 2017 LEGAL SCHOLAR ROUNDTABLE, Seoul, Korea, 21-22 Sept., 2017;
Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal,
17 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L. J. 261 (2016), http://www.ssm.com/abstract-2314119; Lawrence J.
Trautman, Scott Shackelford, Peter Swire & Peter C. Ormerod, Cyber Threats to Business:
Identifying and Responding to Digital Attacks (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
237. Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who 's Who & How It
Works, 5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 147(2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About
U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J. L., TECH. & POL'Y 341 (2015)http://ssm.com/abstract-2548561.
238. Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230
(2016).
239. Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the
Emerging
Threat
to
Corporations
(Aug.
24,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid'3238293.
240. See Amber Phillips, With Money Laundering Charges Against Paul Manafort, Trump 's
'Fake News'
Claim
is Harder
to Defend,
WASH.
POST
(Oct. 30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/30/with-this-paul-manafortindictment-trumps-fake-news-defense-has-zero-credibiity/?utm-term=.I6faf6775760; see also
Lawrence J. Trautman, Grab 'Em By the Emoluments: The Crumbling Ethical Foundation of
Donald Trump's Presidency, 17 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (2018).
18,
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displeasure about the FCPA. Courtesy of The FCPA Professor Blog, we
learn from a post during 2012 that "Trump was unscripted and blunt when
speaking of the [FCPA] in relation to Wal-Mart's FCPA scrutiny focused
241
licenses and permits."
on alleged payments in Mexico to obtain various
Then, in a "CNBC SquawkBox interview (beginning at the 14-minute
mark) Trump said that 'this country is absolutely crazy' to prosecute
242
In addition,
alleged FCPA violations in places like Mexico and China.,
should be
it
and
law
"horrible
a
is
Trump then remarked that the FCPA
243 FCPA
changed' and it puts U.S. business at a 'huge disadvantage.'
compliance attorney Tom Fox writes:
I think it unlikely that a Trump administration will change
much in the way of FCPA enforcement for several reasons:
some political, some practical, some legal and one optical.
On the political side, the FCPA is a key component in the
international fight against terrorism. The direct link between
corruption and terrorism is not only well-founded but has,
unfortunately, been demonstrated again and again. Even low
level corruption in the form of facilitation payments, which
are exempted out of the FCPA, have been seen to directly
lead to terrorism in the form of porous borders. While I doubt
that businessman Trump understood the link between
terrorism and corruption, I am certain that President Trump
will either learn about this link very quickly or will be told
multiple times by his security advisors. With his emphasis
on U.S. security from terrorism, the Trump Administration
on terrorism by
will not want to be seen as softening the war244
guys.
bad
the
for
easier
even making things
The Gibson Dunn 2018 Mid-Year FCPA Update concludes, "The
steady clip of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ... prosecutions set in 2017
has continued apace into the first half of 2018, largely quieting any
questions of enforcement of this important statute under the current
[Trump] Administration."' 245 Gibson Dunn further states, "From our
perspective, all signs point to business as usual at the U.S. Department of

241. Mike Koehler, Donald Trump: The FCPA Is a "HorribleLaw andShould Be Changed,
FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Aug. 6, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/donad-trump-the-fcpa-is-ahorrible-law-and-it-should-be-changed/.
242. Id.

243. Id.
244. Thomas R. Fox, FCPA Enforcement and Compliance Under Trump, 4 EMORY CORP.
Gov. & ACCT. REv. 79, 80 (2016).
Mid245. Memorandum from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP to Clients and Friends, 2018
20
18/07/
End FCPA Update 1 (July 9, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018-mid-year-fcpa-update.pdf.
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Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the two
regulators charged with enforcing the FCPA. ' '24 6
CONCLUSION

In the more than forty years since inception of the FCPA, bribery and
corruption have remained real and pressing issues for American business.
The need for internal controls related to compliance and record-keeping
has also been a constant theme during that time but added to it in recent
years is a need to meet stakeholder expectations for managing risk. The
COSO ERM Framework is one way to manage FCPA associated risks.
Whatever framework or analysis is used, companies should conduct an
external analysis that includes study of current trends in FCPA
enforcement. Some information can also be found in the remarks of the
current administration. The government Guidance issued in 2012 has
limited usefulness for FCPA risk analysis, as does studying the
requirements under and enforcement of corrupt practices acts/laws in
other nations. DPAs can be a useful source of information for risk
analysis, despite questions about their use for FCPA enforcement and
relation to rule of law.

246. Id.
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